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973 
SERIOUS ERROR WITH “SERIOUS ERROR”: 
REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM OF  
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Six days following Professor James Liebman and his colleagues’ 
release of the study A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-
1995 (the “Liebman Study”),1 Washington Post columnist David Broder 
wrote: 
In the annals of politics, there have been few pieces of social 
research which have decisively affected the course of policy debate. 
Michael Harrington’s “The Other America”2 opened the eyes of the 
nation—and of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson—to the extent of 
poverty in this nation. Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s essay on “The 
Negro Family”3 alerted President Richard Nixon and his successors 
to the plight of female-headed welfare families. 
 Now, there may be a third. James S. Liebman’s just-published 
report, “A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases 1973-
1995,” 4 transforms the debate on the death penalty as much as those 
earlier works did the understanding of poverty and welfare in 
America.5  
This Note is written as a warning to Mr. Broder and those who have 
read and will read the Liebman Study. Although the study tracks “serious 
error”6 found throughout capital cases in the U.S. judicial system, the 
study contains serious error itself. This Note does not claim that Professor 
Liebman and his colleagues’ conclusions are incorrect. It may be true that 
 
 
 1. James S. Liebman, Jeffery Fagan, & Valerie West, A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital 
Cases, 1973-1995, (June 12, 2000), at http://justice.policy.net/jpreport/index.html [hereinafter 
Liebman Study], reprinted in James S. Liebman, Jeffery Fagan, Valerie West, & Jonathan Lloyd, 
Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839 (2000) (abridged 
version of the original) [hereinafter Capital Attrition]. 
 2. MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1962). 
 3. OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING & RESEARCH , U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: 
THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965). 
 4. Liebman Study, supra  note 1. 
 5. David Broder, Editorial, Broken Justice, WASH . POST, June 18, 2000, at B7 (emphasis and 
notes added). 
 6. “Serious error” as referenced in this Note refers to “serious error” as defined by the Liebman 
Study. See Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 134-37 nn.33-40. For a discussion of “serious error,” as 
defined by the Liebman Study, see infra Part IV.B. 
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the U.S. capital punishment system is wrought with “serious error,” 7 in 
need of serious reform,8 and “broken.”9 However, such conclusions are not 
supported by the data found in the Liebman Study or the analysis 
conducted within it.10 As policy makers and legal experts begin to use the 
conclusions of the Liebman Study as part of their decision-making 
process,11 those who analyze the study must assure the public that the 
study’s conclusions are properly supported. This Note specifically 
addresses the degree of significance that policy makers, legal experts, and 
the general public can place on the conclusive findings of the Liebman 
Study. 
Although the Liebman Study attempts to determine whether the U.S. 
capital punishment system is “broken,” 12 in the course of their study, the 
authors execute procedures that cast doubt upon the validity of their 
conclusions. Their data is unavailable for peer review;13 certain important 
parts of the study are left out from the analysis;14 key variables are vaguely 
defined;15 and the authors make unsupported assumptions about the 
meaning of certain variables.16  
This Note assesses the validity of the Liebman Study’s conclusions and 
the significance of its results. Part II of this Note provides both a general 
background of the recent history of capital punishment and an overview of 
certain aspects of social scientific research. Part III of this Note discusses 
the history, findings, and recent impact of the Liebman Study. Part IV of 
this Note examines the data, analysis, and process of the Liebman Study. 
Part V of this Note discusses the proper methodology and data analysis 
that the Liebman Study’s authors could have utilized to successfully 
support the study’s conclusions.  
 
 
 7. Liebman Study, supra  note 1, at 134-37 nn.33-40. 
 8. Id. at 121-24. 
 9. Id. For a discussion of the Liebman Study  and its conclusions, see infra Parts III-IV. 
 10. See discussion infra  Parts IV-V. 
 11. See infra  notes 85-88 and accompanying discussion. 
 12. Liebman Study, supra  note 1, at 121-24. 
 13. See Ronald Eisenberg, Prosecutor Comments on Latzer and Cauthen, PROSECUTOR, Jan./Feb. 
2001, at 16, 16 (noting that Professor Liebman and his colleagues’ “refusal to share underlying data 
with researchers” and how such actions are “particularly troubling”). Further, the information on the 
variables within the study is too vague for a reader to assess the distinct data collection and selection 
procedure of Professor Liebman and his colleagues. See, e.g., Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 134-37 
nn.33-40. 
 14. See, e.g., Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 64, 68, 80 (discarding the use of Virginia in the 
study’s state-by-state analysis because it does not support their theory). 
 15. See, e.g., id. at 134-37 nn.33-40 (describing the study’s definition of “serious error”). 
 16. See discussion infra  Part IV.B.2 (discussing how high rates of capital “serious error,” as 
defined by the Liebman Study, are not an indication, as the study claims, of a broken system). 
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II. GENERAL BACKGROUND 
A. Recent Historical Background of Capital Punishment17 
During the twenty-three year span of the data utilized within the 
Liebman Study, from 1973 to 1995,18 many legal events occurred that 
dramatically altered the state of the U.S. capital punishment system.19 Just 
one year before the study’s data range began, the Supreme Court found the 
death penalty, as applied by the states, unconstitutional as “cruel and 
unusual punishment” under the Eighth Amendment.20 Following this 
determination in Furman v. Georgia,21 many states reformed and rewrote 
their capital statutes to ensure that they complied with the Court’s 
definition of “cruel and unusual punishment.”22 In fact, Furman touched 
off the biggest flurry of capital punishment legislation the nation had ever 
seen.23 For the next two and a half decades, the Court continued to both 
reject and approve states’ new capital punishment statutes, and 
consequently, individual state capital sentences were either thrown out as 
unconstitutional or validated.24 By means of this continual volley 
 
 
 17. For a more detailed historical discussion of capital punishment, see generally STUART 
BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY : AN AMERICAN HISTORY  (forthcoming spring 2002) (manuscript on 
file with author); RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1991). 
 18. Liebman Study, supra  note 1, at 6. 
 19. See BANNER, supra  note 17 (manuscript at ch. 10); PATERNOSTER, supra  note 17, at 35-159. 
 20. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”) (emphasis added). For more discussion regarding the 
connection between the Eighth Amendment and capital punishment, see FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & 
GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA 50-76 (1986); H. A. Bedau, 
Why the Death Penalty Is a Cruel and Unusual Punishment, in  THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA : 
CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 232, 232-37 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997). 
 The Court made this determination with its 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia , 408 U.S. 238 
(1972). For a more detailed discussion about the Furman decision and its impact, see PATERNOSTER, 
supra  note 17, at 59-68, 155-56; James W. Marquart & Jonathan R. Sorensen, A National Study of the 
Furman-Commuted Inmates: Assessing the Threat to Society from Capital Offenders, in  THE DEATH 
PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES, supra, at 163-67. 
 21. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 22. See BANNER, supra  note 17 (manuscript at ch. 10); PATERNOSTER, supra  note 17, at 35-159. 
 23. See BANNER, supra note 17 (manuscript at ch. 10); PATERNOSTER, supra note 17, at 75-77; 
ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra  note 20, at 39-45. 
 24. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417-18 (1993) (approving Texas’s court death 
penalty procedures by holding that a habeas claim is only for imprisonment violations, and thus a 
claim of true innocence that was based on recently discovered evidence was not proper grounds for 
federal habeas corpus relief); Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 478-80 (1993) (approving Idaho’s death 
penalty statute by holding that the requirement of a defendant to exhibit “utter disregard for human 
life,” as construed by Idaho Supreme Court to refer to the “cold-blooded, pitiless slayer,” was not 
facially invalid); Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 751 (1992) (striking down an Illinois death penalty 
statute by holding that, because due process requires that a jury undertaking capital sentencing must be 
impartial and indifferent, jury members may not hold biases for/against the death penalty and they may 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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be struck as so); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 824-30 (1991) (approving Tennessee’s death 
penalty statute by holding that having a jury in a capital case consider victim impact statements is not 
barred by the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 372-
78 (1989) (approving Kentucky’s death penalty stat ute by holding that the imposition of capital 
punishment on a sixteen to seventeen year old is valid and is not considered “cruel and unusual 
punishment” under the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 
339-40 (1989) (striking down a Texas death penalty statute by holding that the absence of instructions 
informing a jury that it could consider evidence of defendant’s conditions of mental retardation and 
abused background deprived the jury of a method for expressing its “reasoned moral response” to 
mitigating evidence in rendering sentencing decision (violating the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution), but that the execution of mentally retarded people convicted of 
capital crimes is not prohibited by the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution); Maynard v. 
Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 365-66 (1988) (striking down an Oklahoma death penalty statute by holding 
that an aggravating circumstance described as “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” was 
unconstitutionally vague; that it did not offer sufficient guidance to the jury in deciding whether to 
impose capital punishment; that the presence of an additional, unchallenged, aggravating circumstance 
did not validate the death sentence where the state had no procedure for attempting to maintain a death 
penalty when one of several aggravating circumstances was held to be invalid or unsupported; and that 
the effect of recent decisions of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, which would limit the 
aggravatin g circumstance to torture or serious physical abuse cases, was to be decided originally by 
state courts, not federal ones); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 317-20 (1987) (approving 
Georgia’s death penalty statutes by holding that a study indicating that a state’s capital punishment 
verdicts are more often imposed in cases with black defendants and white victims than with white 
defendants and black victims was not enough for the state to have violated the Fourteenth or Eighth 
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157-60 (1987) (approving an 
Arizona death penalty statute by holding that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit capital 
punishment in the case of a defendant whose participation in a felony-murder is significant and whose 
mens rea is one of reckless indifference); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 417-18 (1986) (striking 
down a Florida death penalty statute by holding that the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
prohibits a state from imposing the death penalty upon a prisoner who is insane); California v. Ramos, 
463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983) (approving California’s death penalty statute by holding that an 
instruction regarding the commutation powers is not necessary under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 886-90 (1983) (approving 
Georgia’s death penalty statute by affirming a state court imposition of the death penalty after it 
invalidated one aggravating circumstance, even though the jury found two aggravating circumstances 
applicable); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800-01 (1982) (striking down Florida’s death penalty 
statute by holding that the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits a capital sentence for 
a defendant who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing or lethal force will be 
employed); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114-17 (1982) (striking down Oklahoma’s death 
penalty statute by holding that a state court must consider a defendant’s upbringing and mental state as 
mitigating factors in a capital case when applicable); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432-33 (1980) 
(striking down a Georgia death penalty statute by holding that any aggravating circumstance that is 
vague and broad—meaning that it does not imply any inherent restraint on the arbitrary and capricious 
infliction of a death sentence, such as “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman,”—violates 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608-
09 (1978) (striking down Ohio’s death penalty statute by holding that jurors with biased opinions 
about the death penalty may be excluded, and state capital statutes must include individualized 
consideration of mitigating factors required by Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. 
Constitution); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 589-600 (1977) (striking down a Georgia death penalty 
statute regarding rape by holding that capital punishment for rape was in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution); Fowler v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 904 (1976) (striking down 
North Carolina’s death penalty statute by holding that North Carolina’s imposition of the death 
penalty, without a proper a bifurcated trial, constituted cruel and unusual punishment); Gregg v. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss3/7
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throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s, the Court refined the 
parameters of capital punishment and states jostled to bring their capital 
punishment system in line with the Court’s parameters.25 Thus, many 
capital punishment sentences in the two decades following Furman were 
vacated due to the Court’s interpretation of the constitutional validity of 
capital punishment, rather than factual or procedural problems. 
Aside from challenges to the constitutional basis of capital punishment, 
many authors and commentators have criticized its existence and usage. In 
the twenty-nine years following Furman, analysts have criticized the 
quality and payment of capital defense counsel, sentencing guide lines, 
judicial objectivity, the length and cost of capital cases, and the stability of 
the capital system itself.26 Through empirical evidence of appellate court 
 
 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176-87 (1976) (approving Georgia’s death penalty statute by holding that 
Georgia’s capital punishment statute for murder does not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution; that retribut ion and the possibility of deterence could be 
considered by legislatures to determine whether the death penalty should be imposed; and that 
bifurcated trials, with the jury hearing extra evidence and argument before determining whether to 
impose capital punishment, was constitutional).  
 The preceding Supreme Court cases in the decades succeeding Furman demonstrate that during 
this period (which is the first twenty years of the twenty-three year data range of the Liebman Study) 
the Supreme Court constantly updated and transformed its treatment of and stance on capital 
punishment. The holdings of the preceding cases are examples of how these reformatting decisions 
affected numerous capital cases and decisions within Federal and state courts. For a more thorough 
analysis regarding the Court’s capital punishment precedent during this time period, see BANNER, 
supra  note 17 (manuscript at ch. 10); ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra  note 20, at 37-69; David A. J. 
Richards, Constitutional Interpretation, History, and the Death Penalty, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN 
AMERICA : CURRENT CONTROVERSIES, supra  note 20, at 214-31; Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, 
Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital 
Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 361-70 (1995). For more analysis of the specific impact of the 
Furman and Gregg decisions and their progeny, see BANNER supra note 17 (manuscript at ch. 10); 
ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra  note 20, at 43-73; PATERNOSTER, supra note 17, at 5-112; Marquart & 
Sorensen, supra note 20, at 163-65.  
 25. See BANNER, supra note 17 (manuscript at ch. 10). 
 26. See, e.g., DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL ., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL 
AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990) (discussing how death penalty discrimination post-Furman occurred 
not in the race of the defendant, but in the race of the victim); WALTER BERNS,  FOR CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT: CRIME AND THE MORALITY OF THE DEATH PENALTY 173 (1979) (arguing that criminal 
law “must remind us of the moral order by which alone we can live as human beings. . . . and in our 
day the only punishment that can do this is capital punishment”); BARRY NAKELL & KENNETH A. 
HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH PENALTY  (1987) (arguing that black victims were less 
likely to have their killers receive the death penalty than white victims); Craig J. Albert, Challenging 
Deterrence: New Insights on Capital Punishment Derived from Panel Data , 60 U. P ITT. L. REV. 321 
(1999) (arguing against a deterrent effect of capital punishment); Kenneth L. Avio, Capital 
Punishment, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, 201 (Peter 
Newman ed., 1998) (discussing the literature and arguments behind the deterrent effect of capital 
punishment and a brief history of other challenges to the rationales of capital punishment); David C. 
Baldus & James W.L. Cole, A Comparison of the Work of Thorsten Sellin and Isaac Ehrlich on the 
Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 170 (1975) (discussing the validity of prior 
research and analysis on a possible deterrent effect of capital punishment); William J. Bowers & Glenn 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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decisions regarding capital trials, the Liebman Study attempts to show both 
the degree of error and problems within the nation’s capital punishment 
system.27 Further, the study attempts to show a difference in treatment of 
capital punishment between states.28 The authors of the Liebman Study 
assert that the a consensus of the U.S. population29 regarding crisis-level 
problems within the U.S. death penalty system initiated the study.30 
B. General Overview of Social Scientific Research 
In order to support and validate their conclusions, most social scientific 
scholars agree that the authors of an empirical study must follow certain 
social scientific research processes.31 A study cannot simply state a 
hypothesis, interpret some data, and then claim that the hypothesis is 
correct.32 This Note will address a few of these essential processes or 
 
 
L. Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich’s Research on Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 
187 (1975) (discussing the nonexistence of a deterrent effect of capital punishment and arguing 
inconsistencies, such as the effect of murder rate, in Ehrlich’s work); Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent 
Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 397 (1975) (arguing 
for the truth of a deterrent effect of capital punishment); Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Chase, 
Hardening the Attitudes: Americans’ Views on the Death Penalty , in  THE DEATH PENALTY IN 
AMERICA : CURRENT CONTROVERSIES, supra  note 20, at 90 (discussing reasons why the death penalty 
is continually popular despite having little or no effect on the murder rate); Wayne A. Logan, When 
Balance and Fairness Collide: An Argument for Execution Impact Evidence in Capital Trials, 33 U. 
MICH . J.L. REFORM 1 (2000) (arguing in favor of “execution impact statements,” statements to inform 
the jury of the consequences of condemning the convicted defendant to death); Steiker & Steiker, 
supra note 24, at 371-438, 426 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s post -Gregg path of capital 
punishment “has been a disaster, an enormous regulatory effort with almost no rationalizing effect”); 
Tom R. Tyler & Renee Weber, Support for the Death Penalty: Instrumental Response to Crime, or 
Symbolic Attitude?, 17 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 21 (1982) (discussing the effect of how someone not 
supporting the death penalty in the late Twentieth Century gave the public the impression that the 
person was soft on crime). 
 27. Liebman Study, supra  note 1, at 4-15, 27-51. 
 28. Id. at 51-109. 
 29. Liebman was possibly referring to the category of studies discussed in supra note 26. 
 30. Liebman Study, supra  note 1, at i. 
 31. See GARY KING ET AL ., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY : SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN 
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH  (1994). See also  MICHAEL S. BALL & GREGORY W. H. SMITH, ANALYZING 
VISUAL DATA  (1992); GOURI K. BHATTACHARYYA, STATISTICAL CONCEPTS AND METHODS (1977); 
HUBERT M. BLALOCK ,  JR.  & ANN B. BLALOCK,  METHODOLOGY IN SOCIAL RESEARCH  (1968); 
SHERRYL KLEINMAN &  MARTHA A. COPP,  EMOTIONS AND FIELDWORK  (1993); CHARLES W. 
LACHENMEYER, THE ESSENCE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH : A COPERNICAN REVOLUTION (1973); TIM MAY, 
SOCIAL RESEARCH : ISSUES, METHODS, AND PROCESS (1993); GUNNAR MYRDAL, OBJECTIVITY IN 
SOCIAL RESEARCH  (1969); ROYCE SINGLETON,  JR. ET AL. ,  APPROACHES TO SOCIAL RESEARCH 
(1988); PAUL C.  STERN , EVALUATING SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH  (1979); LEROY WOLINS, 
RESEARCH MISTAKES IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (1982); SONIA R. WRIGHT, 
QUANTITATIVE METHODS AND STATISTICS: A GUIDE TO SOCIAL RESEARCH (1979).  
 32. See KING ET AL ., supra note 31, at 20-27 (explaining that a study cannot claim a hypothesis’s 
validation without proper support and statistical analysis). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss3/7
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methodologies in the context of Professor Liebman and his colleagues’ 
validation of their study’s results.33  
The results of a proper empirical study must be replicable.34 Anyone 
reading the study must be able to conduct the study again and obtain the 
same results with the same information that the original authors used to 
conduct the study.35  
In addition, a study should attempt to prove its “null hypothesis.”36 In 
fact, a study’s suggested hypothesis is not proven until it has disproved its 
null hypothesis.37 The authors of any empirical study must undertake steps 
 
 
 33. See infra  Part IV.A. See also  discussion infra Parts IV.B-C. 
 34. In fact, one research handbook states as an important general guideline, “All data and 
analyses should, insofar as possible be replicable .” KING ET AL., supra  note 31, at 26. See also 
BLALOCK & BLALOCK , supra  note 31, at 13-17, 172-78; KING ET AL., supra  note 31, at 8, 25-27, 151; 
SINGLETON ET AL., supra note 31, at 56-57, 117-23, 177, 339-74; WRIGHT, supra  note 31, at 45-49.  A 
study must be replicable to ensure that the study’s conclusions are valid and to show that the author’s 
work is valid. KING ET AL., supra note 31, at 26-27.  
 The problem of replication can be highlighted by the 1989 Fleischmann/Pons cold fusion fiasco.  
Two scientists, Fleischmann and Pons, announced the successful conduction of cold fusion at room 
temperature. See Otis Port, Fusion in a Bottle: Can it Be That Easy?, BUS. WK., Apr. 10, 1989, at 86.  
Cold fusion, the melding of two independent atoms without extremely high temperatures, if done 
successfully, could supply pollution-free power with seawater as fuel, eliminating many of our planet’s 
fuel problems. Id. at 86-87.  However, Fleischmann and Pons’s support for the findings were 
extremely poor and no other scientists were able to replicate the study; thus, within a few weeks the 
success was forgotten and the discovery discounted. See Sharon Begley, ‘Cold Fusion’: More 
Questions, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 24, 1989, at 6; Phillip Elmer-DeWitt & Michael D. Lemonick, Fusion 
Illusion, T IME , May 8, 1989, at 72, 72-77; Otis Port, Fusion in a Bottle: Can it Be That Easy?, BUS. 
WK., Apr. 10, 1989, at 86-87; Otis Port, Table-Top Fusion Looks Less Like a Parlor Trick, BUS. WK., 
Apr. 24, 1989, at 132, 132-36. 
 35. See BLALOCK & BLALOCK , supra  note 31, at 172-78; KING ET AL., supra  note 31, at 26-27; 
SINGLETON ET AL ., supra note 31, at 56-57, 177, 337, 339-74. 
 36. WRIGHT, supra  note 31, at 93-94 (“The null hypothesis states that the experimental treatment 
did not have any effect and that the observed difference is due solely to the operation of chance 
factors.”). See also  BLALOCK & BLALOCK , supra note 31, at 390-92; KING ET AL., supra note 31, at 
46-47; SINGLETON ET AL., supra  note 31, at 56-57.  
 37. WRIGHT, supra note 31, at 94 (“The null hypothesis, then, is a competing explanation . . . 
must be ruled out before any confidence can be placed on the causal hypothesis per se.”). See also 
BLALOCK & BLALOCK, supra  note 31, at 390-91, 422-23; KING ET AL ., supra  note 31, at 20, 28-31, 
46-47; SINGLETON ET AL., supra  note 31, at 54-60; WRIGHT, supra note 31, at 93-94, 99, 103-05, 117, 
120-21, 129.  
 The term “alternative hypothesis” has two different meanings in social scientific research 
literature that should be explained and clarified to better comprehend the significance of disproving a 
study’s null hypothesis. To most researchers, “alternative hypothesis” is the study’s actual proposed 
hypothesis, the possibility that the suggested relationship between the variables “did produce the 
observed results.” WRIGHT, supra  note 31, at 94. Thus, as a study is able to further disprove its null 
hypothesis, its alternative hypothesis is more likely to be true. Id. Other researchers state that a study’s 
“alternative hypotheses” are those possibilities that a different relationship between the variables, 
besides the study’s proposed hypothesis, is creating the observed effect. BLALOCK & BLALOCK , supra 
note 31, at 390-91; SINGLETON ET AL., supra note 31, at 57. According to this view, a study’s proposed 
hypothesis is more likely to be true when the study is able to further disprove a high number of 
alternative hypotheses along with its null hypothesis. Id. Regardless of the terminology, all 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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to show that what they are attempting to prove is wrong or that their 
independent variable has no effect on the dependent variable.38 The null 
hypothesis of a study is the possibility that independent variable(s) of a 
study have no effect on the dependent variable.39 In other words, the null 
hypothesis is the idea that the study’s proposed theory is neither positively 
nor negatively valid, but rather of no effect.40 In order to support the 
conclusion that their proposed hypothesis is more true than not, an author 
must ultimately fail in this analysis.41 If a study’s authors cannot eliminate 
the possible existence of the null hypothesis by the collected data, then 
they cannot claim that their proposed hypothesis is valid. 42  
Further, a proper empirical study must develop proper measurements 
for evaluating the existing observable implications that can be tested to 
prove its hypothesis.43 The variables that a study’s authors choose to 
explain their hypothesis must have proper real world manifestations and 
the ability to be measured.44 The authors should choose measurements and 
variables that can explain their hypothesis through data.45 Additionally, a 
study can utilize certain methods of comparing and analyzing data to 
present its data in a more persuasive manner.46 Authors of studies may 
utilize such tools as Pearson’s correlation coefficient,47 R2 statistic,48 and 
 
 
methodology guides agree that a study needs to refute its null hypotheses to show that its proposed 
hypothesis is more likely valid than not. See BLALOCK & BLALOCK , supra note 31, at 390-91; KING ET 
AL., supra note 31, at 28-31; SINGLETON ET AL., supra note 31, at 54-60; WRIGHT, supra  note 31, at 
93-94. 
 38. See KING ET AL ., supra  note 31, at 28-31. 
 39. BLALOCK & BLALOCK, supra  note 31, at 391-93; WRIGHT, supra note 31, at 93-94. 
 40. WRIGHT, supra  note 31, at 93-94. 
 41. See id. at 99-114, 168-70; WRIGHT, supra  note 31, at 93-94, 103-05. 
 42. KING ET AL., supra note 31, at 28-29; SINGLETON ET AL., supra  note 31, at 56-57. 
 43. See KING ET AL., supra  note 31, at 150-53; SINGLETON ET AL., supra  note 31, at 98-101; 
WRIGHT, supra  note 31, at 42-49. See also  BLALOCK & BLALOCK , supra  note 31, at 171-72. Directors 
of a study must measure every variable and possible observation and the directors should describe the 
parameters involved in that selection for explanation and clarification within the study. KING ET AL., 
supra  note 31, at 141-49, 150-53. 
 44. KING ET AL ., supra  note 31, at 151, 168; SINGLETON ET AL., supra note 31, at 98-99; 
WRIGHT, supra  note 31, at 42-49.  
 45. See KING ET AL ., supra  note 31, at 141-49. 
 46. See id. at 141-68. 
 47. See MARIJA J. NORUSIS,  GUIDE TO DATA ANALYSIS, 365-66 (1999), SINGLETON ET AL ., 
supra  note 31, at 78, 407; WRIGHT, supra  note 31, at 144-46. Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
measures the degree of fit of the regression line to the data. WRIGHT, supra  note 31, at 144. In other 
words, its calculation compares the degree of uniformity of two data sets. See id.  
 48. See NORUSIS, supra  note 47, at 388; WRIGHT, supra note 31, at 150. In multiple regression 
analysis, R2 is a measure of the “proportional variance of [the observed values] explained by the linear 
combination of the set of independent variables expressed in a prediction equation.” WRIGHT, supra 
note 31, at 150. 
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single/multiple linear regression analysis49 to show the relevance of data 
and disprove a study’s null hypothesis.  
III. OVERVIEW OF THE LIEBMAN STUDY 
A. Historical Background of the Liebman Study 
Professor Liebman and his colleagues released the Liebman Study on 
June 12, 2000 and published it on the Web site of The Justice Project.50 In 
the wake of its release, newspapers across the United States announced the 
study’s findings.51 The headlines of these newspaper reports read: Study: 
Most Death Penalty Cases Have Significant Flaws,52 U.S. Death-Row 
System Fraught with Errors: Study,53 Death Penalty Cases Fail in 
Review.54 One editorial described the Liebman Study as “[a]nother nail in 
the coffin of the death penalty.”55 Following the June 2000 release of the 
study on the Internet, the authors published a shortened version in the 
Texas Law Review.56 
Just under a decade before the study’s release, Professor Liebman 
proposed to a congressional committee, upon the suggestion of its 
 
 
 49. See KING ET AL ., supra  note 31, at 96-97, 130-32, 168-69; WRIGHT, supra  note 31, at 135-58. 
Linear regression analysis (multiple and single) illustrates the relationship between two variables, or 
data sets, by means of a linear mathematical equation. WRIGHT, supra  note 31, at 135-36. 
 50. See Liebman Study, supra note 1, at Introduction. According to its Web site, “The Justice 
Project is committed to: educating the American public about our deeply flawed capital justice system; 
sustaining a national dialogue between our leaders and the public which rigorously examines a system 
which fails to protect the innocent; mounting federal and state legislative efforts to change the 
unfairness in our capital justice system; and developing partnerships with advocates everywhere who 
share our mission and commitment.” The Justice Project, About the Campaign, at 
http://justice.policy.net/about/ index.vtml (last visited Mar. 26, 2001). 
 51. See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, Study Finds Majority of Death Penalty Cases Rife with Error, 
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 12, 2000, at A1; Frank Green, Broken System or Better 
One? Study: VA. Reverses Fewest Death-Penalty Cases in U.S., RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, June 
12, 2000, at A1; Douglas Holt & Bruce Jaspen, Study: Most Death Penalty Cases Have Significant 
Flaws, CHI. TRIB., June 12, 2000, at 7; Brooke A. Masters, Flaws Lead Courts to Overturn Majority of 
Death Penalty Cases, DET. NEWS, June 12, 2000, at 4; Brooke A. Masters, Most Death Sentences 
Reversed, Study Finds, WASH . POST, June 12, 2000, at A10; Mark Skertic, Death Case Errors 
Common, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 12, 2000, at 24; Henry Weinstein, Death Penalty Is Overturned in 
Most Cases; Justice: Study Finds Courts Void Executions More Than Two -Thirds of the Time, L.A. 
TIMES, June 12, 2000, at A1. 
 52. See Holt & Jaspen, supra  note 51, at A1. 
 53. US Death -Row System Fraught with Errors: Study, AGENCE FR.-PRESSEE, June 12, 2000, 
available at 2000 WL 2811890. 
 54. Brooke A. Masters, Death Penalty Cases Fail in Review, TIMES UNION (Albany), June 12, 
2000, at A1. 
 55. Editorial, New Evidence of Errors Fuels Death-Penalty Doubts, USA T ODAY, June 12, 2000, 
at 18A. 
 56. Capital Attrition , supra note 1, at 1839. 
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members, that a study chronicling the possible error within U.S. habeas 
corpus cases might be worthwhile.57 In response to this suggestion, from 
1991 to June 2000, Professor Liebman58 and the study’s other authors 
collected, organized, and analyzed the data and theories in the study.59 
Using the information imbedded within capital cases for the twenty-three 
year span from 1973 to 1995, the study’s authors sought to confirm or 
deny their concerns about the U.S. capital punishment system. 60 The 
authors tracked the movement of all capital cases from this time period 
through the state and federal judicial systems.61 By assigning values to 
certain judicial actions 62 that are possible within capital cases, the authors 
compiled data that spoke to the collective treatment of capital cases during 
that period within the judicial system.63  
 
 
 57. See Hearings on Habeas Corpus Reform Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional 
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. (1991) (statement of James Liebman, Vice 
Dean and Professor, Columbia University School of Law). See also  Description of A Broken System: 
Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, at http://justice.policy.net/jpreport/ index.html (June 12, 
2000) (“In 1991 the Chair of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary asked Professor James 
Liebman of the Columbia University School of Law to calculate the frequency of relief in habeas 
corpus cases.”). 
 58. Professor Liebman has consistently worked as an anti-death penalty advocate. See Eisenberg, 
supra  note 13, at 16 (noting that Professor Liebman’s refusal to disclose the study’s data is especially 
troubling considering “Liebman maintains an active criminal defense practice and has been litigating 
against the death penalty since long before he became a professor”). Professor Liebman served as 
Assistant Counsel, NAACP  Legal Defense and Educational Fund from 1979 to 1985 where he 
specialized in capital punishment and habeas corpus matters. See Faculty and Administration - 
Columbia Law School, James S. Liebman (2000), at http://30.law.columbia.edu/faculty/ 
jLiebman.html. See also  The Italian Academy for Advanced Studies in America at Columbia 
University Presents: Moratorium on the Death Penalty (1998), at http://30.italianacademy. 
columbia.edu/lectures/Moratorium/bios/Liebman.html. “Since 1982, he has argued four capital habeas 
corpus cases in the United States Supreme Court . . . . He was awarded a 1999 Soros Senior Justice 
Fellowship to support public advocacy on . . . the death penalty in the United States.” Id.  
 For a discussion on objectivity on social scientific research, see KING, supra note 31, at 27-28, 63-
65, 161-65 (noting that without proper acknowledgment and strict adherence to procedure, bias and 
extreme objectivity within social scientific research can be a serious problem); MYRDAL, supra note 
31, at 43-49 (stating that bias in research exists naturally; however, independence of one’s bias in the 
conducting of one’s research and strong empirical processes can negate any ill effects of such bias); 
and see generally KLEINMAN & COPP, supra note 31 (discussing the consequences of having strong 
emotions or bias in research). 
 59. Liebman Study, supra  note 1, at xxi, acknowledgments. 
 60. The authors were fueled by concerns that (1) “many feel capital trials put people on death 
row who don’t belong there” and (2) “capital appeals take too long.” Id. at 1. 
 61. Id. at 5 (monitoring how appellate courts treated certain cases, to be collected from the study 
between 1973-1995). 
 62. Id. at 5, 134-37 nn.33-42 (including, but not for every case, judicial actions such as the 
reversal, remand, or approval of a trial court’s decision as well as the overturning of the original trial 
courts conviction or sentence). 
 63. Id. at 5. 
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B. Results of the Liebman Study 
The Liebman Study attempted to address “the reliability—indeed, the 
bare reliability—of the death penalty system as a whole.”64 The authors 
discussed two beliefs that they claim spurred their inquiry65—that the 
transition from death sentence to execution is too slow and that the death 
sentences themselves are “fraught with error.”66 
To address these beliefs, the authors collected an immense amount of 
data. Beginning in 1991, the authors collected published information and 
case histories from an undisclosed amount of capital cases.67 Professor 
Liebman and his colleagues continued to compile data from these cases as 
they matured through the U.S. judicial system.68 They examined the state 
and federal appellate decisions, from 1973 to 1995, which reviewed state 
trial courts’ capital cases.69 The authors concluded that of the 5,760 capital 
convictions rendered by state courts, sixty-eight percent contained “error 
that substantially undermines the reliability of the guilt finding or death 
sentence imposed at trial.”70 Professor Liebman and his colleagues did not 
collect the same information about every case. Some cases received closer 
attention because certain case information was available from published 
opinions and the Legal Defense Fund of the NAACP.71 The authors then 
tabulated and analyzed the results.72 
The authors concluded that the U.S. “capital punishment system [is] 
collapsing under the weight of its own mistakes.” 73 The study announced 
that the overall “serious error rate” of the capital punishment system is 
sixty-eight percent and that the death sentence itself was removed upon 
retrial in a very high proportion of those cases.74 Additionally, according 
to Professor Liebman and his colleagues, the rates of reversal between 
states varied; thus, some states had a more favorable rate of “serious error” 
 
 
 64. Liebman Study, supra  note 1, at 2. 
 65. Id. at 4. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 5, 27. 
 68. Id. at 5, 27-28, 132-33 n.26. 
 69. Id. at 132-33 n.26. 
 70. Liebman Study, supra  note 1, at 134-37 nn.33-42. According to Professor Liebman and his 
colleagues, courts reversed forty-one percent of those cases on “serious error” during direct appeals; 
state court decisions reversed forty-seven percent of those cases; and when habeas corpus review was 
added to the scenario, sixty-eight percent of all capital cases contained “serious error.” Id. 
 71. Id. at 5. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 124. 
 74. Id. at 6. 
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than others.75 From these findings, the Liebman Study declared that the 
system “must fail to catch and correct some of the error that has flooded 
the system” and it is consequently “broken.”76 
C. Impact and Reaction to the Liebman Study 
With the increase of DNA evidence77 and the anti-capital punishment 
attitude of many Americans,78 numerous people have heralded and cited to 
the Liebman Study. Many publications have written editorials centered on 
the findings of the Liebman Study.79 In fact, one editorial noted that the 
study’s “results are startling,”  80 while another even called for legislation to 
correct the problems that the study claims to have unearthed.81 Further, 
many social science, political science, and legal authorities have 
commented favorably on the study. 82 These authorities agree with the 
study’s call for capital punishment reform and accept the study’s 
conclusions as fact.83 As one legal periodical noted, “The press reported 
[the Liebman Study] with great fanfare and as an established fact. There 
has been no media effort to explore the flaws and exaggerations in 
Liebman’s analysis.”84 A smaller number of experts (mostly two 
professors from John Jay College of Criminal Justice) have been mildly 
critical of the study in short, poignant pieces and some address the 
 
 
 75. Liebman Study, supra  note 1, at 7. 
 76. Id. at 121. 
 77. See generally, e.g., ABA Okays Recommendation on Collection of DNA Evidence, ARIZ. 
ATT’Y, Nov. 2000, at 9, 9; Peter Donnelly & Richard D. Friedman, DNA Database Searches and the 
Legal Consumption of Scientific Evidence, 97 MICH . L. REV. 931 (1997).  
 78. See BANNER, supra  note 17 (manuscript at ch. 10); discussion supra note 26. 
 79. See, e.g. , Editorial, Pass a Resolution to Condemn Death Penalty: Death Penalty Debate 
Continues, SYRACUSE HERALD-J., July 7, 2000, at A10; Editorial, Serious, Reversible Error, 161 N.J. 
L.J. 890 (2000); David Sarasohn, Editorial, Put Captial Punishment Out of Its Misery, PORTLAND 
ORGANIAN, June 10, 2001, at C04. 
 80. Serious, Reversible Error, supra  note 79, at 890. 
 81. Pass a Resolution to Condemn Death Penalty: Death Penalty Debate Continues, supra note 
79, at A10. 
 82. See, e.g., Alan Berlow, The Broken Machinery of Death , 12 AM. PROSPECT 1617, 1617 
(2001); Eric Black, Media Watch: Who Put the Death Penalty on the Agenda?, STAR-T RIB., July 13, 
2000, at 16A; Broder, supra note 5, at B7; Vincent E. Doyle III, Doubting Our Death Penalty Systems, 
225 N.Y. L.J. 53 (2001); Judge Rudolf J. Gerber, On Dispensing Injustice, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 135 
(2001); Scott Goldstein, Death Penalty Foes Call for Moratorium , 9 N.J. LAW.: WKLY. NEWSPAPER 
1315 (2000); Neil Seeman, Review, Capital Questions: What is Fueling the Growing Opposition to 
the Death Penalty? , NAT’L POST, Aug. 5, 2000, at B1; Teresa Stepzinski, Death Penalty Draws Fire: 
Report Paints Bleak Picture of Capital Punishment, Pointing Out High Numbers of Errors in the 
Process, FLA. TIMES UNION, June 24, 2000, at A1. 
 83. See Broder, supra  note 5, at A25; Goldstein, supra note 82, at 1315; Stepzinski, supra note 
82, at A1. 
 84. Eisenberg, supra  note 13, at 16. 
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authors’ bias against the death penalty. 85 In defense, Professor Liebman 
and his colleagues have responded to most of the criticism with specific, 
targeted rebuttals.86  
Despite the slight criticism, the Liebman Study has garnered influential 
support.87 In fact, before the one-month anniversary of the study’s release, 
both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate used the study as 
support for legislation. 88 State legislatures have also used the study to 
 
 
 85. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra  note 13, at 16; Joseph L. Hoffman, Violence and the Truth , 76 
IND. L. J. 939 (2001) (Special Feature: The Harry Pratter Professorship Lecture); Barry Latzer & 
James N.G. Cauthen, Another Recount: Appeals in Capital Cases, PROSECUTOR, Jan./Feb. 2001, at 25, 
25 [hereinafter Latzer & Cauthen III]; Barry Latzer & James N.G. Cauthen, Capital Appeals Revisited , 
84 JUDICATURE  64 (Sept./Oct. 2000) [hereinafter Latzer & Cauthen I]; Barry Latzer & James N.G. 
Cauthen, The Meaning of Capital Appeals: A Rejoinder to Liebman, Fagan, and West, 84 JUDICATURE 
142 (Nov./Dec. 2000) [hereinafter Latzer & Cauthen II]; Brady Snyder, Is Death -Row Report 
Flawed?, DESERET NEWS, June 20, 2000, at  A1; James Q. Wilson, Editorial, Do Errors in Capital 
Cases Mean Innocent Are Killed?, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 11, 2000, at B5. In fact, the 
university paper of Professor Liebman’s own institution expressed criticism of the Liebman Study . See 
Jamie Sneider, Statistics Fail Activists, COLUMBIA DAILY SPECTATOR, Feb. 6, 2001, available at 2001 
WL 12495817. 
 86. See Jeffery Fagan, James S. Liebman, & Valerie West, Death Is the Whole Ball Game, 84 
JUDICATURE  144 (Nov./Dec. 2000) [hereinafter Fagan et al., Ball Game]; James Liebman, Jeff Fagan, 
& Valerie West, Technical Errors Can Kill, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 4, 2000, at A16 [hereinafter Liebman et 
al., Technical Errors]; James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan, & Valerie West, Death Matters, a Reply to 
Latzer and Cauthen, 84 JUDICATURE 72 (Sept./Oct. 2000) [hereinafter Liebman et al., Death Matters]; 
Valerie West, Jeffrey Fagan, & James S. Liebman, Look Who’s Extrapolating: A Reply to Hoffman, 76 
IND. L.J. 951 (2001) (Special Feature: The Harry Pratter Professor Lecture) [hereinafter West et al., 
Extrapolating]. 
 87. See, e.g., Post-Conviction DNA Testing: When Is Justice Served?: Hearing Before the Senate 
Judiciary Comm., 106th Cong. 4-7, 16, 29 (2000) [hereinafter Senate DNA Hearings] (statements of 
Charles F. Baird, Co-chair, National Comm. to Prevent Wrongful Executions; Sen. Russell Feingold, 
Member, Senate Judiciary Comm.; Sen. Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, Senate Judiciary Comm.; 
Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Comm.); Broder, supra note 5, at B7. 
 88. See Innocence Protection Act: Hearing on H.R. 4167 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 10, 22-23, 38 (2000) [hereinafter House Innocence 
Hearings] (statements by James E. Coleman, Jr., Chair, Section of Individual Rights and 
Responsibilities; Rep. William D. Delahunt, Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary; Rep. Ray 
LaHood); Senate DNA Hearings, supra  note 87, at 4-7, 16, 29 (statements of Charles F. Baird, Co -
chair, National Comm. to Prevent Wrongful Executions; Sen. Russell Feingold, Member, Senate 
Judiciary Comm.; Sen. Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, Senate Judiciary Comm.; Sen. Orrin G. 
Hatch, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Comm.). The media has also used the Liebman Study to encourage 
certain policy, for example Pass a Resolution to Condemn Death Penalty: Death Penalty Debate 
Continues, supra  note 79 at A10. Further, legal authorities have used the Liebman Study  to encourage 
certain policy. See, e.g., Judge Rudolf J. Gerber, On Dispensing Injustice, 43 ARIZ.  L. REV. 135 
(2001); Lissa Griffin, The Correction of Wrongful Conviction: A Comparative Perspective, 16 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 1241 (2001); David McCord, An Open Letter to Govenor George Ryan Concerning 
How to Fix the Death Penalty System , 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 451 (2001); Kenneth Williams, The 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act: What’s Wrong with It and How to Fix It, 33 CONN . L. 
REV. 919 (2001); Denise Young, The Debate over Arizona’s Death Penalty, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Nov. 2000, 
at 26. 
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support legislation. 89 Before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator 
Russell Feingold stated, “[s]tudies like that of Professor Liebman are 
further proof that our nation should suspend all executions. . . . [T]he 
Innocence Protection Act is a first good step in addressing some of the 
most egregious flaws [mentioned in the Liebman Study].”90 In fact, the 
ranking member of the Senate Judiciary Committee introduced a portion 
of the Liebman Study into the Committee’s record.91 The Liebman Study 
has even been used in support of legal decisions in state court.92 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE LIEBMAN STUDY’S PROCESS AND RESULTS 
As the Liebman Study continues to influence public opinion, 
educational dialogue, and legislation, social scientists and legal 
commentators familiar with the study must either assure decision makers 
of the study’s validity or warn them of its deficiencies.93 The data 
collected within the study must properly support its startling conclusions,94 
as the study’s results have the potential to significantly alter the U.S. 
capital punishment system.95 Accordingly, if the Liebman Study’s data and 
analysis support its conclusions, then its role of reform in the discourse of 
the media, legal experts, and policy makers96 is justified. 97 However, if the 
 
 
 89. See, e.g., John Caher, State Bar Meeting to Consider Death Penalty, Cameras in Court, 225 
N.Y. L.J. 1 (2001); Richard Perez-Pena, State Bar Calls for a Halt to Capital Punishment, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2001, at 30. 
 90. Senate DNA Hearings, supra  note 87, at 6-7 (statement of Sen. Russell Feingold, Member, 
Senate Judiciary Comm.). Also, outside of legislative hearings, politicians have used the Liebman 
Study to encourage certain Policy. See e.g., Sen. Russ Feingold, The Death Penalty Under Attack, 16-
SUM CRIM. JUST. 18 (2001). 
 91. See Senate DNA Hearings, supra note 87, at 4-7 (statements of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, 
Chairman, Senate Judiciary Comm.; Sen. Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, Senate Judiciary Comm.). 
 92. Williams v. State, 31 P.3d 1046 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001).  
 93. Because legislation based upon the Liebman Study would attempt to fix the study’s alleged 
“broken system,” before such legislation occurs, legislators must be assured that a potential fix would 
be beneficial to the U.S. capital punishment system rather than detrimental. See Liebman Study, supra 
note 1, at 64, 68. See also  supra note 31 and accompanying discussion. 
 94. See KING ET AL ., supra  note 31, at 8, 24-28 (explaining that data claiming to support a 
hypothesis must be shown to do so); WRIGHT, supra  note 31, at 44-49 (explaining the importance of 
supporting a proposed hypothesis with proper data). 
 95. See, e.g., House Innocence Hearings, supra  note 88, at 10, 22-23, 38 (statements by James E. 
Coleman, Jr., Chair, Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities; Rep. William D. Delahunt, 
Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary; Rep. Ray LaHood); Senate DNA Hearings, supra note 87, at 
4-7, 16, 29 (statements of Sen. Russell Feingold, Member, Senate Judiciary Comm.; Sen. Orrin G. 
Hatch, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Comm.; Sen. Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, Senate Judiciary 
Comm.); Pass a Resolution to Condemn Death Penalty: Death Penalty Debate Continues, supra  note 
79 at A10. 
 96. See, e.g., Broder, supra  note 5, at B7; Goldstein, supra  note 82, at 1315; Stepzinski, supra 
note 82, at A1. 
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study’s data does not confirm its conclusions and the study’s analysis does 
not validate its own findings, then the stated conclusions of the Liebman 
Study are not conclusions but rather solely unsupported hypotheses.98 
Thus, as policy makers and others consider basing decisions on the 
findings of the Liebman Study, they should also know whether those 
findings are proper conclusions or unsupported hypotheses.  
The Liebman Study’s authors assert that the U.S. capital punishment 
system is “broken.”99 In support of this conclusion, Professor Liebman and 
his colleagues kept their data private,100 established conclusions through 
vague variables,101 used data from a chaotic period in capital punishment 
history,102 assumed that appellate reversal is problematic,103 and 
disregarded certain states in state-by-state analysis.104 The analysis section 
of this Note will evaluate the effect of Professor Liebman and his 
colleagues’ actions and determine the significance of these actions upon 
the study’s conclusions. 
As part of the evaluation of the Liebman Study, this section of the Note 
will discuss the social scientific methodology, measurement, analysis, and 
conclusions found within the study. The ensuing discussion regarding the 
process and results of the Liebman Study will include an evaluation of the 
following statistical aspects of the study: (A) proper statistical 
methodology for empirical social scientific research,105 (B) the authors’ 
use of “serious error” to conclude that the U.S. capital punishment system 
is broken,106 and (C) the study’s state-by-state comparisons of both 
“serious error” and non-“serious error.”107 
 
 
 97. See KING ET AL., supra  note 31, at 6-8, 24-28 (explaining that a reader can only rely on a 
study’s justified hypothesis if the hypothesis is properly empirically supported). 
 98. See id. 
 99. Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 121-24. 
 100. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 16 (noting Professor Liebman and his colleagues’ 
“refusal to share underlying data with researchers”). 
 101. See, e.g., Liebman Study, supra  note 1, at 134-37 nn.33-40 (describing the study’s definition 
of “serious error”). 
 102. See Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 67, 128 n.7; discussion supra Part II.A. 
 103. See discussion infra  Part IV.B.2 (discussing how high rates of capital “serious error,” as 
defined by the Liebman Study, are not an indication, as the study claims, of a broken system). 
 104. See Liebman Study , supra note 1, at 64, 68, 80 (discarding the use of Virginia in the study’s 
state-by-state analysis because it does not conform to their theory). 
 105. See infra  Part IV.A. 
 106. See infra  Part IV.B. 
 107. See infra  Part IV.C. 
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A. Validity of the Liebman Study’s Data, Measurement, and Methodology 
The conclusions of the Liebman Study’s authors are based on data that 
no reader of the study can ascertain or evaluate. The study’s data is 
unavailable for confirmation. 108 In addtion, the study’s authors attempt to 
bolster their proposed hypothesis rather than question its validity,109 and 
the study’s measurement values chosen by the authors are not proper 
observations.110 Actions such as making data unavailable and eliminating a 
critical state from state-by-state analysis are not typical in any field of 
research.111  
Statistically speaking, any study that attempts to confirm a theory or 
validate an idea cannot solely state its hypothesis followed by its 
conclusion and assume that any reader will support those conclusions.112 
Between the hypothesis 113 and conclusion, an author must reveal data and 
proper statistical analysis.114 Despite the fact that most theories in social 
science can never be proven outright,115 most social scientists and 
statistical guides have established principles and guidelines which, if 
followed by a study, lead to a greater (or lesser) likelihood that a proposed 
hypothesis is confirmed.116 In their analysis and process, the authors of the 
Liebman Study violated a number of social scientific research principles, 
which are all specific standard empirical study practices that are employed 
to confirm valid inferences, thereby making their analysis appear 
incomplete.117  
 
 
 108. See infra notes 118-43 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra  note 13, at 16 
(noting Professor Liebman and his colleagues’ “refusal to share underlying data with researchers”). 
 109. See infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Liebman Study, supra  note 1, at 64, 
68, 80 (ignoring Virginia’s error rates); id. at 137 n.40 (using a tim e period for their data that would 
increase error rates). 
 110. See infra  notes 150-57 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 
134-37 nn.33-40; discussion supra  Part IV.B.1. 
 111. See Eisenberg, supra  note 13, at 16 (preventing data dissemination); Liebman Study, supra 
note 1, at 64, 68, 80, 137 n.40 (disregarding certain state data). 
 112. See supra note 94. 
 113. In this Note, the term “proposed hypothesis” refers to the study’s author’s prediction 
regarding the relationship between certain variables. Many social scientists refer to this hypothesis as 
the “causal” or “alternative” hypothesis. Compare BLALOCK & BLALOCK, supra  note 31, at 390-91, 
with WRIGHT, supra  note 31, at 93.  
 114. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 115. See KING ET AL., supra note 31, at 7-12; SINGLETON ET AL ., supra note 31, at 35-37, 52-58. 
In social scientific research, one is merely making inferences about the world through observations. 
KING ET AL., supra note 31, at 7-12. 
 116. SINGLETON ET AL ., supra  note 31, at 53-54 (stating that one can truly prove no conclusion, 
but rather through proper procedure and inferences, a study can show that a proposed hypothesis is 
more and more likely to be true).  
 117. See KING ET AL., supra note 31, at 230 (“Valid inference is possible only so long as the 
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First, the authors of the Liebman Study prevented others in the legal 
and social scientific field from confirming their results.118 In social 
scientific terms, the study is not replicable.119 No one can repeat the results 
of the Liebman Study.120 In fact, the authors’ data is neither available nor 
accessible.121 Aside from the lack of variable description and data within 
the study,122 the authors have personally denied a request to view the 
actual data from the study.123 Reporting all aspects of the data collection 
and the data itself is critical for establishing reproductibility and 
supporting the study’s conclusion.124 As one guide states, “The most 
important rule for all data collection is to report how the data were created 
and how we came to possess them.”125 Although the Liebman Study’s 
authors informed the reader that the study did not analyze all 5,760 death 
 
 
inherent logic underlying all social scientific research is understood and followed.”). 
 118. See Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 16 (noting Professor Liebman and his colleagues’ “refusal to 
share underlying data with researchers” and how such actions are “particularly troubling in light of 
media misrepresentations of Liebman as a neutral professor heading a Columbia University study”); 
Latzer & Cauthen III, supra note 85, at 26 n.11 (“Upon our request, Prof. Liebman declined to release 
his data to us.”); Letter from James S. Liebman, Professor, Columbia School of Law, to Adam L. 
VanGrack, Student, Washington Univ ersity School of Law 1 (Feb. 6, 2001) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Liebman Data Letter] (explaining the Liebman Study authors’ decision to withhold/delay 
the study’s data upon request). While the letter indicates a future posting of the data, such action has 
not occurred. See id. It is also important to note that any data received may not even be the pure 
primary variable data that researchers need to determine replicability. Professor Liebman and his 
colleagues’ refusal to release the data prevents others from using such data to confirm the results of the 
study. See KING ET AL., supra note 31, at 230-31. See generally  Liebman Study, supra  note 1. 
 119. Compare su pra  note 118, with BLALOCK & BLALOCK, supra  note 31, at 13-17, 172-78, and 
KING ET AL ., supra note 31, at 8, 25-27, 151, and SINGLETON ET AL ., supra note 31, at 56-57, 117-23, 
177, 339-74, and  WRIGHT, supra note 31, at 45-49. 
 120. See generally Liebman Study, supra  note 1. As the study failed to pinpoint the data used to 
prove the hypothesis, a reader is unable to find or utilize such data. 
 121. See Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 16; discussion supra note 118. 
 122. See infra  Parts IV.A-B. 
 123. See Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 16; Latzer & Cauthen III, supra  note 85, at 26 n.11; 
Liebman Data Letter; discussion supra  note 118. The authors of the Liebman Study refused to share 
their data with the author, inquiring academics, or the general public. Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 16. 
In fact, because the data may only include figures of the authors’ already judged cases, the Liebman 
data may not even be the true information that would enable the reader to determine how the authors 
of the study selected the data within “serious error” or other variables. Liebman Data Letter, supra 
note 118, at 1. 
 One social scientific research commentator noted that “science . . . is public, not private.” ROBERT 
K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE  37 (1968 Free Press) (1949). The authors of 
any social scientific research have a duty to make their research, along with a detailed description of 
the methodology taken in that research, public. KING E T AL., supra note 31, at 7-9. The true validity of 
a study takes place in the public discourse; thus, if the public cannot analyze the study, then one cannot 
ascertain the true validity of the study. Id. Consequently, the lack of methodology and data that 
Professor Liebman and his colleagues have offered to the public create uncertainty concerning their 
conclusions.   
 124. KING ET AL., supra note 31, at 51. 
 125. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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sentences from 1973-1995,126 the reader does not know which cases were 
placed into which variable category.127 Although Professor Liebman and 
his colleagues limited their study to 4,578 specific cases that had 
completed the appellate process, the study’s procedure is questionable and 
the use of the entire 1973-1995 time period is problematic.128 Even though 
early dates in this data range include chaotic events in capital 
punishment’s constitutionality,129 Professor Liebman and his colleagues 
did not explain why using this time period, versus a more recent era,130 
would be most effective. With more recent data,131 less chaotic time 
periods,132 and more clear case selection,133 the study’s data would be 
more indicative of the current state of the U.S. capital punishment system. 
In fact, though the authors indicated that some of the data came from 
certain consulted printed opinions and various NAACP case records,134 the 
authors did not clarify the following: which specific cases they viewed, 
which sources from each case they observed, and how they chose any of 
those cases. Because a collection of cases solely from such sources may 
include only certain types of cases, such information about the data is 
important to assess the data’s reliability. 135 In fact, of the limited 
information that is available in the study, some has already been reported 
to be incorrect.136 Unfortunately, with the unavailability of specific data 
 
 
 126. Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 137 n.40. 
 127. The Liebman Study failed to include this information about the study’s data. 
 128. See Liebman Study , supra  note 1, at 5-6, 134 n.33, 136-37 n.40. The authors located all of the 
5,760 capital cases from 1973-1995 but only reviewed the 4,578 cases that had fully reached direct 
state review. Id. at 137 n.40. 
 129. See supra Part II.A. 
 130. Other social scientists roughly calculated some of the same statistics as the Liebman Study 
for the 1990s, and with fewer resources than the Liebman Study . See Latzer & Cauthen I, supra  note 
85, at 65-69. In response, the Liebman Study authors did not criticize Latzer and Cauthen’s use of 
these more recent years, while Latzer and Cauthen did criticize the Liebman Study authors for their 
choice of time periods. Compare Liebman et al., Death Matters, supra  note 86, at 72-74, with  Latzer & 
Cauthen I, supra note 85, at 64-66. As more data is available for the later years, the Liebman Study 
notably failed to utilize a proportional representation of this more up-to-date data, especially 
considering their confusing methods of determining “serious error.” See Liebman Study, supra note 1, 
at 134 n.33; infra  Part IV.B. 
 131. See Latzer & Cauthen I, supra note 85, at 65-69. 
 132. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 133. The study’s authors selected certain nonrandom data that was conveniently available. 
Liebman Study , supra note 1, at 5. The use of data such as NAACP records undoubtedly emphasized 
certain “error prone” cases, which had expensive appellate defense counsel, as opposed to the average 
death penalty appeal. 
 134. Id. at 5. 
 135. See KING ET AL ., supra  note 31, at 7-9. 
 136. Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 16 (noting that “[r]eports from Florida and Utah prove that [the 
study] mislabelled cases as reversals when they were not, and anecdotal evidence from other states 
suggests additional problems”). 
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information and questionable data selection, the authors’ data cannot be 
guaranteed to be representative of the true state of the U.S. capital 
punishment system.137  
Adding to the problem of reproducibility, certain general aspects of the 
authors’ analysis create uncertainty that makes replication impossible. The 
authors use variables such as “serious error”138 and “overall error rates”139 
to support their conclusions.140 Although the study defines these terms, the 
authors’ case selection process and individual definitions are vague.141 
Presented with any number of cases that the authors analyzed, a reader 
cannot be certain that they will find the same “serious error” as the authors 
did in the study. 142 Questions of author objectivity further exentuate many 
of these data problems considering that Professor Liebman is a constant, 
vocal anti-death penalty advocate and that the Soros Foundation, an anti-
capital punishment group with the stated purpose to “find effective ways 
to curb the [death] penalty’s use,”143 significantly funded the Liebman 
Study. Because members of the legal and social scientific community 
cannot replicate the Liebman Study, the public cannot fully accept the 
conclusions that the study draws from Professor Liebman and his 
colleagues’ data and analysis. 
Second, in their analysis, the Liebman Study’s authors made choices in 
their procedure to bolster their results in support of their proposed theory, 
rather than relying on the most functional and useful data possible. In 
social scientific terms, the authors made no attempt to support, confirm, or 
reference their null hypothesis.144 As the Liebman Study posited that U.S. 
capital punishment system is broken and fraught with error, the study’s 
null hypothesis was the possibility that the U.S. capital punishment system 
is as sound and non error prone as other parts of the U.S. judicial 
system.145 However, Professor Liebman and his colleagues never posit that 
their theory could be wrong. On the contrary, they continually explained 
 
 
 137. For a more detailed discussion regarding the need for data to be public and error in relying on 
a study’s conclusions without its data, see KING ET AL ., supra  note 31, at 8-9, 51-57. 
 138. For a discussion of the Liebman Study’s definition of “serious error,” see Liebman Study, 
supra note 1, at 134-37 nn.33-42; infra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.  
 139. For a discussion of the Liebman Study’s definition of “overall error rate,” see Liebman Study, 
supra note 1, at 6, 136 n.39. 
 140. Id. at 134-37 nn.33-40. 
 141. See id. at 121-24, 134-37 nn.33-40. For further discussion of the problems with the “serious 
error” variable, see infra notes 140-43 and accompanying discussion. 
 142. For further discussion of the problems with the “serious error” variable, see discussion infra 
Part IV.B. 
 143. See Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 16; discussion supra note 58. 
 144. See BLALOCK & BLALOCK , supra note 31, at 390-92; WRIGHT, supra  note 31, at 93-94. 
 145. The Liebman Study itself does not address its null hypothesis.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p973 Vangrack.doc  2/28/2002   5:11 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
992 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 79:973 
 
 
 
 
how every data set bolstered their theory regardless of other 
possible/likely interpretations.146 In fact, the authors labeled certain 
information, which could support their null hypothesis, as “clearly an 
outlier.”147 To avoid a problematic occurrence, the authors ignored the low 
error rates of Virginia.148 In spite of Virginia’s nonconformance to their 
theory, the authors consider Virginia’s figures unimportant.149 As the 
authors did not conceive any counter explanations or theories, the 
conclusions given may not be the only valid theories to explain their data 
analysis. 
Finally, the study’s choices of measurement confuse different aspects 
of the U.S. judicial system. In other words, the authors of the Liebman 
Study improperly conceived the specific measurement choices selected to 
show the observable implications of their theory.150 The authors’ main 
theory attempted to explain a dependent variable’s occurrence (the U.S. 
capital system is broken) through an independent variable’s prominence 
(“serious error”).151 This measurement choice for an independent variable 
(“serious error”) did not succeed in showing, explaining, or exemplifying 
that the U.S. capital punishment system is broken.152 Further, the study’s 
variable of “serious error” is not only a measure of capital trial court error, 
but also a simultaneous measure of the willingness of appellate court[s] to 
reverse.153 Unfortunately, neither of these two characteristics of the 
variable can be separated.154 The measurement of variables in the Liebman 
Study lacks association with observable implications, which properly 
measured variables contain. 155 An independent variable must be properly 
measurable, and it must be able to distinctly explain the theory when 
aligned with the dependent variable.156 Because “serious error” does not 
accomplish either of these criteria for a proper measurement,157 the 
 
 
 146. Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 40-43, 74-75, 79-80, 116. 
 147. Capital Attrition , supra note 1, at 1858. 
 148. Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 64, 68, 80.  
 149. Id. 
 150. See KING ET AL., supra  note 31, at 28-30, 139-49; SINGLETON ET AL ., supra  note 31, at 31-
32. “Observable implications” are those real world manifestations that  could indicate the existence of 
the alternative hypothesis and, as such, guide the data. KING ET AL., supra  note 31, at 28-30.  
 151. Liebman Study, supra note 1, at  i-iii. 
 152. See discussion infra  Part IV.B. 
 153. See discussion infra  Part IV.B. 
 154. See discussion infra  Part IV.C. 
 155. See KING ET AL ., supra  note 31, at 139-85; SINGLETON ET AL., supra note 31, at 97-105. 
 156. See BLALOCK & BLALOCK , supra note 31, at 13-23, 28-57, 172-74; KING ET AL ., supra  note 
31, at 139-85; SINGLETON ET AL ., supra note 31, at 97-105; WRIGHT, supra note 31, at 44-49. 
 157. See discussion infra  Part IV.B. 
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author’s conclusions about the degree of “brokenness” in the U.S. capital 
punishment system is unfounded. 
B. Assumptions of the Liebman Study’s “Serious Error”158 
One of the major claims by the authors of the Liebman Study is that 
sixty-eight percent of all U.S. capital cases have “serious error.”159 This 
figure’s prominence is evident by its significant visibility in numerous 
periodical announcements and articles regarding the study. 160 This 
emphasis is justifiable because the study supports many of its ultimate 
conclusions upon this variable and uses it in numerous methods.161 Thus, 
one must properly evaluate the variable “serious error” and its 
measurement by the authors to effectively evaluate the Liebman Study. As 
a result, the definition of “serious error,” its usage as a measurement value, 
and its usage as an independent variable by the authors merit attention.  
The Liebman Study’s treatment of “serious error” contains two major 
problems. First, the high proportion of “serious error” claimed by the 
authors162 may not be as high in today’s capital punishment system as the 
Liebman Study concludes.163 Second, a high proportion of “serious error” 
 
 
 158. Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 134-37 nn.33-42 (defining “serious error”). 
 159. The authors determined the actual sixty-eight percent figure by calculating a 
series of passage rates at each stage of the appeals process and adding them up. See id. at 
136-37 n.40.  
Because 41% of the capital judgments reviewed on state direct appeal were found to be 
tainted by serious error, only 59% of those judgments were available for state post-conviction 
review. Because at least 10% (this figure is probably higher, see supra note 38; infra 
Appendix C, pp. C-1 to C-2) of that 59%—meaning at least 5.9% of the original pool (.10 x 
.59 = .059)—failed this second, state post -conviction inspection, the overall rate of error 
found by state courts is 47% (41% + 6%) of the original pool. Then, of the 53% (100% - 47% 
= 53%) of capital judgments that were available for federal habeas review, 40%—meaning 
21% of the original pool (.40 x .53)—failed the federal inspection. The “overall error rate” 
thus is at least 68% of the overall pool (41% + =  6% + 21% = =  68%). In other words: At 
least 68% of the capital judgments that were fully inspected were found seriously flawed at 
some stage. 
Id. at 136-37 n.40. 
 160. See Fox Butterfield, Death Case Study Finds Many Flaws: Review of Capital Punishment 
Shows Two -Thirds Reversal Rate, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 12, 2000, at A1; Marcia Coyle, 
68% Error Rate Found in Death Case Study: Author Calls Serious Problems ‘Epidemic’ , NAT’L L.J., 
June 19, 2000, at A1, A8; Brooke A. Masters, 68% of Death -Penalty Cases Reversed, SEATTLE TIMES, 
June 12, 2000, at A1. 
 161. Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 7, 11, 38-41, 55-56, 60-61, 64, 68-69, 79, 134-37 nn.33-42. 
 162. Sixty-eight percent nationally. Id. at 5-7. 
 163. This Note uses the term “may” in this context because the study lacks data for proper 
analysis. See discussion supra Part IV.A. This uncertainty concerning “serious error” is a distinct 
problem and casts further doubt on the conclusions presented in the Liebman Study. 
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does not explain or indicate that our capital punishment system is broken 
as the authors claim it does.164 
1. How Much “Serious Error” Exists?  
The Liebman Study’s finding of “serious error” may not be as high as 
claimed in the study. 165 On its first page, the Liebman Study defined 
“serious error” as “error substantially undermining the reliability of capital 
verdicts.”166 However, despite the fact that the study itself referred to 
“serious error” as being reversals of decisions,167 overturning of 
verdicts,168 and serious fault,169 the authors’ actual method of measuring 
“serious error” is unclear from the study.170  
First, although the study included a series of footnotes vaguely 
describing the methodology of “serious error,” the authors did not explain 
clearly which appellate decisions Professor Liebman and his colleagues 
labeled “serious error.”171 A reader of the study, when presented with all 
 
 
 164. Liebman Study, supra  note 1, at 124-26. 
 165. The authors claim that “serious error” exists for sixty-eight percent of all capital cases. Id. at 
121-26. 
 166. See id. at 2. 
 167. Id. at 7. 
 168. Id. at 6. 
 169. Liebman Study, supra  note 1, at 134-37 nn.33-40. 
 170. See id. at 134-37 nn.33-42. 
 171. The authors present a vague notion of “serious error,” defining it as “error that substantially 
undermines the reliability of the guilt finding or death sentence imposed at trial.” Id. at 6. However, in 
previous and subsequent footnotes of the Liebman Study, they attempt to explain their personal 
methodology in selecting those cases that have “serious error.” See id. at 134-37 nn.33-40. 
 In footnote 33, the authors attempt to explain the criteria they deemed sufficient to designate 
having serious error:  
In calculating error rates, we count only errors that result in reversal of a capital conviction or 
sentence. To do so, the error must be “serious” in three respects that render our calculation of 
“error” conservative. First, to be reversible, error must be prejudicial, either because the 
defendant has actually shown that it probably affected the outcome of his case or because it is 
the kind of error that almost always has that effect. See generally 2 James S. Liebman & 
Randy Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure §§ 32.1, 32.3, 32.4 (3d ed. 
2000) (generally discussing the harmless error doctrine). The vast majority of error that state 
appellate courts discover is deemed harmless and does not result in reveral [sic]. . . .  
. . . .  
Second, to be reversible, error generally must have been properly preserved. Most state direct 
appeal courts will not grant relief based on error—no matter how egregious and prejudicial—
that the defendant did not properly preserve by way of (1) a timely objection at trial, (2) 
reiteration in a timely new trial motion at the end of trial, and (3) timely and proper assertion 
on appeal. See 1 Liebman & Hertz, supra §§ 7.1a, at 276-77 & n.29, 26.1. This is true even in 
cases in which the failure to preserve the error was the fault of counsel, not the defendant, and 
even in many instances in which the lawyer’s mistake resulted from inexperience, 
incompetence or sheer stupidity, and not a valid exercise of professional judgment. See 
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of the capital cases from 1973 to 1995, would not be able to choose 
definitively which cases contained “serious error” and which cases did not. 
The authors state that in their “serious error” calculations they only 
included “prejudicial” errors that undermine the decision and those errors 
 
 
Stephen B. Bright, Death by Lottery—Procedural Bar of Constitutional Claims in Capital 
Cases Due to Inadequate Representation of Indig ent Defendants, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 679, 683 
(1990); Randall Coyne & Lyn Entzeroth, Report Regarding Implementation of the American 
Bar Association’s Recommendations and Resolutions Concerning the Death Penalty and 
Calling for a Moratorium on Executions, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3, 28-30 (1996). 
Numerous prisoners have been executed despite acknowledged prejudicial errors affecting 
their convictions and sentences, because they failed to preserve their objections. . . .  
 Finally and most obviously, error—no matter how prejudicial—only results in reversal if 
it is discovered. If it is not discovered, because, for example, the party responsible for it fails 
to disclose it, see, e.g., infra note 98, reversal will not occur and the error will not be deemed 
“serious” by our measure. 
 Hundreds of examples of “serious error” found in state post-conviction proceedings are 
collected in Appendix C infra . Dozens of examples of the even narrower category of “serious 
error” that warrants federal habeas relief are collected in Appendix D infra. See also cases 
cited infra notes 36, 44, 97-106. 
Liebman Study, supra  note 1 at 134-35 n.33.  
 Footnote 36 describes the difference between serious error in direct and post -conviction cases: 
The category of “serious error” that leads to state post-conviction reversal is narrower than 
“serious error” at the direct appeal stage, cf. supra note 33, because, generally, only properly 
preserved state and federal constitutional violations that (1) were not, and (2) could not have 
been raised on direct appeal can be the basis for state post -conviction reversal. As at the direct 
appeal stage, moreover, error—no matter how egregious and how much it undermines the 
accuracy of the capital verdict —never gets corrected at the state post -conviction stage (and 
thus does not count as “serious error” in our analysis) unless it is discovered and litigated. See 
supra note 33. And given the failure of a number of capital-sentencing states—Virginia, 
prominent among them—to provide any lawyers or funding for them at all at the state post-
conviction stage, the likelihood that serious error will not be discovered and litigat ed in state 
post-conviction proceedings is often very high. 
Id. at 135 n.36. 
 Footnote 38 describes the notion of serious error within federal habeas corpus appeals: 
The definition of “serious error” that warrants reversal in federal habeas corpus proceedings 
is even narrower than the analogous definitions at the direct appeal stage (which is set out 
supra note 33 and accompanying text) and at the state post -conviction stage (see supra note 
35). This is because error is only reversible on habeas if it meets the three criteria for 
“seriousness” on direct appeal-the error must be (1) prejudicial, (2) properly preserved and (3) 
discovered. 
Id. at 136 n.38. 
 Footnote 39 describes the “overall error rate” (sixty-eight percent figure) as it is in terms of 
“serious error.” 
The “overall error rate” is the proportion of capital judgments thrown out during the first 
(state direct appeal) inspection due to serious error, plus the proportion of the original 
judgments that survive the first inspection but are thrown out at the second (state post-
conviction) inspection, plus the proportion of the original judgments that survive both state 
inspections but are thrown out at the final (federal habeas) stage. The “overall success rate” is 
the converse. In note 40 infra , we use this method to calculate the national composite “overall 
error rate.” 
Id. at 136 n.39. 
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that result in reversals.172 From such a description, one would assume that 
a significant number of these errors eventually caused a reversal of the 
particular conviction or provoked the court to grant a retrial. 173 However, 
Professor Liebman and his colleagues provide no information about the 
eventual result of the 4,578 analyzed capital cases evaluated under the 
Liebman Study174 and had difficulty finding certain information about 
these cases.175 In fact, the authors’ information came from specific 
nonrandom sources that likely led to a prejudicial selection of certain cases 
over others.176 Further, some reports suggest that the authors themselves 
misrepresented cases under their own definitions.177 In fact, in a post-study 
reply, the authors themselves acknowledge a range of interpretation of 
their own data.178 
Out of the 5,760 capital cases from the data span of the study, the 
authors know of only 301 cases in which errors were serious enough to 
merit a retrial and only twenty-two cases where errors were serious 
 
 
 172. Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 134 n.33. 
 173. Because the authors failed to provide the reader any information regarding the eventual result 
of any of the cases besides those in Appendix C, the reader cannot be confident that any (except for the 
301 cases in Appendix C) of the cases labeled “serious error” resulted in a retrial or had any part of the 
case overturned in a final determination. See id. at 134-37 nn.33-40, app. C. 
 174. Although the authors mention the “5,760 death sentences” figure throughout the study, they 
did not analy ze all those death sentences. See id. at 137 n.40. In fact, the authors computed 1,000 
fewer cases into the main study and used even fewer to determine the true rates of conviction/sentence 
reversals. See id. at 137 n.40, C-1, C-2.  
Our “overall error rate” is not the rate of error in the 5,780 [sic] death sentences imposed 
between 1973 and 1995. That number cannot be calculated because, at the end of 1995, many 
of those death sentences were pending in some court awaiting review, but had not yet been 
finally resolved at one of the three inspection stages. This rate instead uses the outcomes of 
the 4,578 cases in which state direct review occurred during the study period, and the 599 of 
those cases in which subsequent federal habeas review occurred, together with the 248 known 
state post-conviction reversals (taken as a proportion of the 2,693 capital judgments that had 
“cleared” state direct appeal) to calculate the error rate found in capital judgments that were 
finally reviewed. 
Id. at 137 n.40. 
 175. See Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 5-6, 133 n.28. 
 176. Id. at 5. 
 177. Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 16 (noting that “[r]eports from Florida and Utah prove that [the 
authors] mislabeled cases as reversals when they were not, and anecdotal evidence from other states 
suggests additional problems”). In fact, a recent study attempting to use data as similar to the Liebman 
Study as possible found that Professor Liebman and his colleages drastically inflated their data, 
whereas the “true serious error rate” is closer to fifty-two percent, not the Liebman Study’s sixty-eight 
percent. Latzer & Cauthen III, supra  note 85, at 26-27.  
 178. West et al., Extrapolating, supra  note 86, at 953 (noting “serious error” rates from forty 
percent to eighty-eight percent). However, despite the beneficial nature of such justifications for use of 
the sixty-eight percent figure, they were not in the original study, are still based on “hidden” data, and 
still mix up different levels of appellate review. See id. See also Hoffman, supra note 85, at 944-47.  
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enough to lead to a conviction reversal. 179 These 301 retrials and twenty-
two reversals came from a separate study within the Liebman Study that 
selected cases in a nonrandom manner and then improperly attempted to 
make parallels between this small, biased sample and the entire U.S. 
capital punishment system.180 Consequently, a reader of the Liebman Study 
is neither assured how serious “serious error” is, nor how important such 
cases are in analyzing whether the U.S. capital punishment system is 
broken. While in a post-study reply the authors note that twenty-two 
reversals alone should indicate a problem within the system,181 (1) in all of 
these twenty-two cases the current system did correct the error182 and (2) 
this small proportion of cases is not what the authors herald in their big 
percentage claims.183 
Second, the time period assessed by Professor Liebman and his 
colleagues is an improper measurement and is therefore not representative 
of the current state of the capital punishment system. The Liebman Study 
authors claim that their “serious error” figure is representative of the 
current system.184 However, the inclusion of data from the 1970s and parts 
of the 1980s does not support such a claim.185 As a result of the numerous 
Supreme Court holdings and state statutory reforms relating to capital 
punishment, the period from 1972 through the mid-1980s was a very 
turbulent time for capital punishment.186 In fact, even Professor Liebman 
and his colleagues note that appellate decisions during the period between 
 
 
 179. Liebman Study, supra  note 1, at app. C. 
 180. Id. at 7, 121-24, app. C. Appendix C of the Liebman Study includes a separate “Post -
Conviction Study.” Id. at app. C. Analyzing 301 nonrandom, post-conviction cases, the Liebman Study 
authors established the conclusions therein. Professor Liebman and his colleagues did not randomly 
select the 301 cases from all of the 5,760 capital cases or even from the post -conviction capital cases. 
Id. at C-1. The authors selected only those cases in which specific information about the cases were 
available. Id. The authors assumed the true conviction and sentencing reversals that occurred in the 
retrials of these 301 cases must be parallel to the 5,760 capital cases in the study and also applicable to 
the current decade. Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 7, 121-24, app. C. For further criticism of this 
aspect of the Liebman Study, see Hoffman, supra  note 85, at 945-47. 
 181. See West et al., Extrapolating, supra  note 86, at 954-56.  
 182. It is continually important to note that experts, including the study’s authors, “still have 
proven no instance, not one, of a mistaken execution during the modern era of American capital 
punishment.” Hoffman, supra  note 85, at 941. See also infra  text accompanying notes 244-45.  
 183. The authors do not answer the questions surrounding the use of only twenty-two cases to all 
capital appeals. See West et al., Extrapolating , supra note 86, at 954-56. If the authors’ only use of the 
twenty-two cases was to show that conviction reversals upon new trials do exist generally, then they 
should not have generalized that the results of Appendix C were indicative of the whole system.  
 184. See Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 14-19. 
 185. See Latzer & Cauthen I, supra  note 85, at 66 n.7. See also supra  notes 22-24 and 
accompanying text. 
 186. See supra  Part II.A. See also  BANNER, supra note 17 (manuscript at ch. 10) (explaining that 
the constant reformatting of the Court’s view on capital punishment caused this volatility). 
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1973 and 1982 were “extremely volatile.”187 As the Supreme Court was 
establishing its own view of constitutional capital punishment,188 state and 
federal courts reacted chaotically towards capital cases.189 As the Court 
invalidated statute after statute,190 many reversals of capital decisions by 
appellate courts were the result of unsettled law rather than trial court 
error.191 Considering the constant approval and disapproval of states’ 
capital punishment statutes in the seventies and eighties,192 much of the 
Liebman Study’s data is skewed. Although Professor Liebman and his 
colleagues have assured the public that only valid, serious trial reversals 
are included in their figures,193 without the authors’ data decisions 
available, one cannot be confident in their decisions.194 Because law-based 
reversals were common during this volatile period,195 they almost certainly 
exist in their data; however, due to the lack of data availability196 and 
replication difficulties with the study,197 readers of the study will never 
know. Moreover, the study’s authors only claim to have limited the 
study’s problem of the turbulent 1970s by removing certain 1976 
decisions.198 Additionally, the authors cannot discount the fact that the 
appellate and trial judges were as highly sensitive and “volatile” as the 
Supreme Court during this period.199 Consequently, a high degree of 
 
 
 187. Liebman Study, supra  note 1, at 67, 128 n.7. 
 188. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 189. See PATERNOSTER, supra  note 17, at 59-68, 155-56; Marquart & Sorensen, supra note 20, at 
163-67. 
 190. See BANNER, supra  note 17 (manscript at ch. 10). See also discussion supra  Part II.A. 
 191. See BANNER, supra note 17 (manuscript at ch. 10); PATERNOSTER, supra note 17, at 59-68, 
156-58. 
 192. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 193. See Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 134 n.33, 138 n.40; Liebman et al., Technical Errors, 
supra note 86, at A16. 
 194. See BLALOCK & BLALOCK , supra  note 31, at 13-17, 172-78; KING ET AL., supra  note 31, at 
8, 25-27, 151; SINGLETON ET AL., supra  note 31, at 56-57, 117-23, 177, 339-74; WRIGHT, supra  note 
31, at 45-49.  
 195. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 196. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 197. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 198. Liebman et al., Technical Errors, supra note 86, at A16. Further, information regarding the 
exact cases that the authors removed is unavailable. While the authors acknowledge the removal, they 
still do not explain the criteria, method, or details on the removal of such decisions. Additionally, for 
proper replicability, the authors should have clarified which cases, during this short time period, they 
excluded from the study. 
 199. Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 42. In fact, the authors also acknowledge that error rates did 
not stabilize until 1983. Id. However, despite this admission, the reader has no idea of the degree of 
volatility during this period or what action, if any, the authors took to address this volatility. Such 
unanswered concerns regarding a crucial variable to the study create reservation towards trusting the 
study’s conclusions.   
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reversals may have been the result of such volatility.200  
Further, because the Liebman Study includes those years when the 
Court itself was unsure about the constitutionality of capital punishment, 
the authors do not present the most useful data to indicate the present 
picture of capital trials.201 In fact, the overall number of death sentences 
itself was extremely erratic until 1982. 202 The authors’ inclusion of cases 
from the decades immediately following Furman203 created more “serious 
error” and favored the authors’ proposed theories. These years included 
law-based reversals and decisions of judges who, unsure of the Court’s 
capital punishment position, would be more likely to reverse a lower court 
decision. 204 Thus, these higher error factors bias the study in favor of the 
anti-capital punishment conclusion that the authors attempt to draw from 
the data. The higher the “serious error” count within the capital system, the 
closer the results will be to the authors’ proposed hypothesis. The bias 
from including this extremely volatile period in capital punishment history 
should not occur in a study that aimed to present the current state of the 
death penalty, as the Liebman Study claimed to do. 
Some commentators have critiqued the Liebman Study as giving a false 
indication of the study’s own defined “serious error” by arguing that the 
authors should only concern themselves with error in convictions.205 As 
defined by the authors, the study’s “serious error” variable refers to 
reversals due to error in convictions and reversals due to error in the 
sentencing.206 Professor Liebman and his colleagues responded to such 
 
 
 200. As a result of the volatility that the U.S. capital punishment system experienced in the 
seventies and eighties, the use of those periods in the Liebman Study leads to in accurate analysis. First, 
many of the “serious error” reversals likely occurred simply from law-based reversals (i.e., changes in 
capital punishment law handed down by the Court), not from trial court malfeasance. See supra  Part 
II.A. See also  discussion supra Part IV.B. However, due to incomplete analysis, the reader is unaware 
of whether such law-based reversals were included in the study. Additionally, while the Court itself 
consistently reformed its capital punishment views, trial and appellate courts, rushing to catch up, 
treated capital cases differently than they do in today’s more calm environment. See BANNER, supra 
note 17 (manuscript at ch. 10). 
 201. See KING ET AL., supra note 31, at 8, 20-29 (explaining that the data presented should be the 
best data available to justify the proposed hypothesis).  
 202. TRACY L. SNELL,  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ,  CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 1998 (1999) [hereinafter CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1998]; TRACY L. SNELL,  BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE , CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1997 (1998); TRACY L. SNELL, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE , CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1996 (1997); T RACY 
L. SNELL,  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ,  CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1995 
(1996).  
 203. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. 
 204. See supra Part II.A. 
 205. See Latzer & Cauthen I, supra note 85, at 64-69. 
 206. See Liebman et al., Death Matters, supra  note 86, at 72-73. The 1976 Supreme Court 
decision reinstituting capital punishment, Gregg v. Georgia , 428 U.S. 153 (1976), allowed capital 
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criticism by stating: any error possibily leading to a defendant’s death, as 
opposed to a life sentence, is as meaningful to their study as an error with 
the conviction. 207 The authors’ defense is correct. Because the authors 
define “serious error,” they should include errors in sentencing. 208 Error at 
the trial level within the capital punishment system exists both during the 
conviction and sentencing phases of the trial. 209 Consequently, the 
bifurcation of capital trials and appeals may explain why the “serious 
error” figures are high, assuming they are, but the inclusion of sentencing 
error within “serious error” is not one of the problems with the variable.  
2. High “Serious Error” Does Not Equal A Broken System 
Even if the Liebman Study’s high rates of “serious error” across the 
U.S. capital punishment system are a valid representation of today’s 
system, such figures do not indicate that the system is “broken.”210 Simply 
because a high percentage of appellate courts reverse lower court capital 
punishment decisions does not necessarily indicate that the system is not 
working.  
First, Professor Liebman and his colleagues have no idea how many of 
these “serious error reversals” actually resulted in changes from the 
original conviction or sentence.211 The only record of true reversals of trial 
court decisions occur in the Liebman Study’s Appendix C (a specific 
independent Post-Conviction Study), which the authors acknowledge is 
“incomplete.”212 In fact, in an interview, Professor Liebman misstates his 
own findings by saying, “[w]hen those cases that we looked at went back 
on retrial, we found that over 80% of them ended up with a sentence less 
than death when the errors were cured.”213 The authors did not reexamine 
 
 
punishment to exist only if the process included a bifurcated trial. Id. at 163, 179-80. The Court 
mandated that states conduct capital trials determining the guilt in one phase and the sentence in the 
other. See BANNER, supra note 17 (manuscript at ch. 10). The sentencing phase was to consist of a 
separate trial in which the judge/jury weighed the aggravated circumstances of the crime against the 
mitigated factors against a capital sentence. Id. at 176-80. See also  BANNER, supra note 17 (manuscript 
at ch. 10). 
 207. See Liebman et al., Death Matters, supra note 86, at 72-77. 
 208. See Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 134 n.33. 
 209. For a similar rebuttal by Professor Liebman and his colleagues, see Liebman et al., Death 
Matters, supra note 86, at 72-75. 
 210. Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 121-24. 
 211. Compare Liebman Study, supra note 1, at app. C., with KING ET AL., supra  note 31, at 120-
38, and WRIGHT, supra note 31, at 35-38. A valid sample of a population must be a representative 
sample. KING ET AL., supra  note 31, at 120-38. Consequently, it must not bias a certain type of 
selection nor be statistically too small a sample to be relevant. Id. 
 212. Liebman Study, supra note 1, at app. C. 
 213. Scot’s Backers Believe Legal Errors in US Could Bring Him a New Trial, THE HERALD 
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those cases with which they found “serious error” in the first place.214 
They only examined 301 specific cases.215 Professor Liebman and his 
colleagues analyzed these cases in a separate study, and the data that they 
received from this sample is not a valid representation of their original 
population of “serious error.”216 First, as the population of capital cases is 
5,760 (plus those from 1995-1999), 301 is not a valid representative 
sample.217 Second, the authors did not choose these 301 cases at random, 
and the selection is in fact biased.218 Because Appendix C does not include 
a large enough sample to measure retrial effect and the figures themselves 
are biased, the authors cannot conclude that certain proportions of 
overturned convictions or sentence remediation exist.  
Second, the study includes no gauge to evaluate the seriousness of 
“serious error.”219 The readers cannot trust that sixty-eight percent of the 
cases that the authors have independently deemed to have “serious error” 
are serious enough to merit our concern. Because the Liebman Study 
includes only a vague methodology through the footnotes, all of the 
“serious error” cases counted for its figures may not merit enough concern 
to conclude that the U.S. capital punishment system is broken. 220 
Third, “a broken system” may not be the cause of high “serious error” 
rates; but rather, our nation’s purposeful twentieth-century adjustments to 
the U.S. capital punishment system produced high “serious error” rates.221 
 
 
(Glasgow, Scotland), Oct. 31, 2000, available at 2000 WL 28099567. 
 214. Liebman Study, supra note 1, at app. C. 
 215. Liebman Study, supra  note 1, at app. C. 
 216. See Liebman Study, supra note 1, at app. C. The 301-case sample in Appendix C is too small 
to be a representative sample of the entire population of capital cases from 1973–1995 (or through 
1999). Statistical authorities necessitate a certain threshold in asserting that a sample population can be 
a valid representation of a population at large. KING ET AL., supra note 31, at 120-38. A sample of 301 
cases is too small for proper analysis of a population of over 5,700 cases. See Id. 
 217. See discussion supra note 216. 
 218. The authors did not choose the 301 cases in the “Post-Conviction Study” at random. See 
Liebman Study, supra note 1, at app. C. According to Professor Liebman and his colleagues, these 
cases were the only cases available to the authors, likely due to the court system overturning a high 
degree of original decisions. See id. This nonrandom factor resulted in a non-representative sample and 
created serious doubt for any parallel that the authors place between the results of their “Post -
Conviction Study” and the true occurrence in the 5,760 death sentences from 1973–1995. 
 219. The degree of seriousness of the Liebman Study authors’ “serious error” is extremely vague. 
See supra  Part III.B. With no data support to form clear delineations, one cannot determine t he degree 
of seriousness of each error noted in the study. 
 220. The degree of significance of the Liebman Study’s main variable, “serious error,” is in doubt. 
This problem could be countered with corrected replicablility in the study. See also  BLALOCK & 
BLALOCK , supra note 31, at 172-78; KING ET AL., supra  note 31, at 26-27; SINGLETON ET AL ., supra 
note 31, at 56-57, 177, 337, 339-74. If, with the data or such direction in the study, one were to 
replicate the results of the study, they would need to gauge (or know how the author gauged) the 
seriousness of each error to label it “serious error.” See KING ET AL., supra  note 31 at 26-27. 
 221. For discussions of some reasons why death is different in the twentieth-century judicial 
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The Supreme Court recognized that “the qualitative difference of death 
from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of 
scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination” 222 and, more 
emphatically, that “death is a punishment different from all other sanctions 
in kind rather than degree.”223 The Court, Congress, and the states have 
each imposed specific high hurdles that exist only for capital cases and 
appeals.224 One of the most evident differences is the bifurcation of the 
capital trial. 225 In redeclaring the death penalty constitutional in 1976, the 
Court required that to impose a death sentence, a capital trial must include 
a separate post-conviction trial to determine whether the convicted 
defendant deserves the death penalty. 226 Following its 1976 decision in 
Gregg v. Georgia ,227 the Court has continued to adjust the procedure and 
components of the sentencing phase of the bifurcated trial.228 With two 
 
 
system, see David McCord, Is Death Different for Purposes of Harmless Error Analysis? Should It 
Be?: An Assessment of United States and Louisiana Supreme Court Case Law, 59 LA. L. REV. 1105 
(1999); Note, The Rhetoric of Difference and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 1599 (2001); Stefanie Lindeman, Note, Because Death Is Different: Legal and Moral Arguments 
for Broadening Defendants Rights to Discovery in Federal Capital Cases, 73 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 541 
(1999). 
 222. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 922, 998-99 (1983). 
 223. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976). 
 224. These include not only such universal hurdles of the bifurcated trial and mandatory appellate 
review, but also state-specific procedures such as mandatory en banc seating of capital appellate 
review in Texas. See BANNER, supra  note 17 (manuscript at ch. 10); TEX.  CONST. art 5, § 4 (“The 
court must sit en banc during proceedings involving capital punishment.”). 
 225. See BANNER, supra  note 17 (manuscript at chs. 9-10). 
 226. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 164-65 (1976). 
 227. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 228. See Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 478-80 (1993) (holding that the requirement of a 
defendant to exhibit “utter disregard for human life,” as construed by the Idaho Supreme Court to refer 
to the “cold-blooded, pitiless slayer,” was not facially invalid); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 
824-30 (1991) (holding that the Eight Amendment of the U.S. Constitutuion does not bar a jury from 
considering victim impact statements in a capital case); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 339-40 
(1989) (holding that the absence of instructions informing a jury that it could consider evidence of 
defendant’s conditions of mental retardation and abused background deprived the jury of a method for 
expressing its “reasoned moral response” to mitigating evidence in rendering sentencing decision 
(violating the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution), but that the execution of 
mentally retarded people convicted of capital crimes is not prohibited by the Eighth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 365-67 (1988) (holding that an aggravating 
circumstance described as “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” was unconstitutionally vague; that 
there was a failure to offer sufficient guidance to the jury in deciding whether to impose capital 
punishment; that the presence of an additional, unchallenged, aggravating circumstance did not 
validate the death sentence where the state had no procedure for attempting to save a death penalty 
when one of several aggravating circumstances was held to be invalid or unsupported; and that state, 
not federal, courts were to originally decide the effect of recent decisions of the Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals, which would limit the aggravating circumstance to torture or serious physical abuse 
cases); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 886-90 (1983) (holding that the death sentence may stand if a 
state court rules an aggravating circumstance invalid, even if the jury finds two or more aggravating 
circumstances applicable); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114-17 (1982) (striking down 
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separate trials, the appealing capital defendant has two trials in which to 
find error, whereas the appealing noncapital defendant has only one.229 In 
fact, the Liebman Study acknowledges that if “serious error” occurs in 
either part of the bifurcated trial, then it counts in their study. 230 Although 
Professor Liebman and his colleagues are justified in including this error 
in their study,231 the Liebman Study needs to acknowledge that this 
additional trial, which only occurs during capital cases, creates a double 
opportunity for “serious error” to occur. Consequently, if the bifurcation 
aspect of the capital system (as the Court has developed it) is working, 
then capital cases should have higher “serious error” rates than noncapital 
cases.  
Additionally, there are other aspects of capital appeals that increase 
capital “serious error” rates over noncapital rates. First, in all states with 
capital punishment, capital cases are given mandatory appellate rights to 
the highest court of the state.232 This mandatory appeal ensures that a 
 
 
Oklahoma’s death penalty statute by holding that a state court must consider a defendant’s upbringing 
and mental state as mitigating factors in a capital case when applicable); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 
420, 432-33 (1980) (holding that any aggravating circumstance that is vague and broad—meaning that 
it does not imply any inherent restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of a death sentence, 
such as “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman,”—violates the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608-09 (1978) (holding that 
one may exclude jurors with biased opinions about the death penalty, and state capital statutes must 
include individualized consideration of mitigating factors required by the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution). 
 229. Each capital defendant received two separate trials, one trial for conviction and one trial for 
sentencing. Unlike a noncapital defendant, the system allows each capital defendant to separately 
appeal two trials, with double the likelihood of finding a sympathetic appellate judge. See Latzer & 
Cauthen I, supra  note 85, at 64-68. 
 230. See Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 134 n.33; Liebman et al., Death Matters, supra note 86, 
at 72-74. 
 231. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1. 
 232. See, e.g. , ALA. CODE § 13A-5-55 (2000) (“ In all cases in which a defendant is sentenced to 
death, the judgment of conviction shall be subject to automatic review.”); DEL.  CODE ANN. tit. 11, 
§ 4209(g)(1) (1999) (“Whenever t he death penalty is imposed, and upon the judgment becoming final 
in the trial court, the recommendation on and imposition of that penalty shall be reviewed on the 
record by the Delaware Supreme Court.”); FLA.  STAT. ch. 921.141(4) (1996) (“The judgment of 
conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court of Florida 
and disposition rendered within two years after the filing of a notice of appeal. Such review by the 
Supreme Court shall have priority over all other cases and shall be heard in accordance with rules 
promulgated by the Supreme Court.”); 720 ILL.  COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(i) (1993) (“The conviction and 
sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court. Such review shall be in 
accordance wit h rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.”); MD. ANN.  CODE  art. 27, § 414 (2000) 
(“Whenever the death penalty is imposed, and the judgment becomes final, the Court of Appeals shall 
review the sentence on the record.”); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.035 (1999) (“ Supreme court to review all 
death sentences.”); N.C. GEN.  STAT. § 15A-2000(d)(1) (2000) (“The judgment of conviction and 
sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
pursuant to procedures established by the Rules of Appellate Procedure. In its review, the Supreme 
Court shall consider the punishment imposed as well as any errors assigned on appeal.”); TEX. CRIM. 
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significant body of judges will review both the conviction and sentencing 
trials for error. Consequently, unlike noncapital cases, all capital cases 
receive appellate review from the highest state court, and as more review 
is given, more reversals occur.233 Additionally, all capital cases, unlike 
noncapital cases, are given a right to federal habeas corpus review.234 
Thus, each defendant convicted of a capital crime is given the right, 
subsequent to mandatory state review, to have the federal judicial system 
review his conviction and sentencing trials.235 As a result of these two 
types of mandatory appellate review,236 capital cases are subject to much 
more judicial review than noncapital cases.237 Thus, capital cases will 
receive more reversals of both the conviction and sentencing trials.238 
Once imposed, courts cannot reverse death. For this reason, the judicial 
actors who address capital cases give those cases greater scrutiny.239 
Judges are prone to look more closely for error in capital cases and to err 
on the side of lifesaving.240 Defendants are more likely to appeal as they 
 
 
PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(2)(h) (Vernon 2000) (“The judgment of conviction and sentence of death 
shall be subject to automatic review by the Court of Criminal Appeals.”). 
 233. While a small-time drug dealer may not want to risk money, time, and effort for an appeal 
that is not guaranteed to be heard, an appealing capital defendant perceives no risk as they are assured 
that their appeal will be heard by at least one appellate court.  
 234. See Habeas Corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994); Special Habeas Corpus Procedures in Capital 
Cases, 28 U.S.C. § 2261 (1994).  
 235. Id. 
 236. These are mandatory state appellate review and mandatory federal habeas corpus review. 
 237. See, e.g., Latzer & Cauthen I, supra  note 85, at 68-71. 
 238. There is a greater chance that one will find a problem when different courts look at a specific 
case for error or problems. Even the Liebman Study  authors acknowledge that more review leads to 
more reversals. See Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 139 n.53. Thus, large amounts of “serious error,” 
as the Liebman Study authors define it, does not necessarily mean that capital cases have more error 
than noncapital cases or that all of these reversals are due to trial court malfeasance. See id. at 5. 
Rather, the high error could simply be the result of a higher degree of review of capital cases than of 
noncapital cases.  
 239. See, e.g., California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 922, 998-99 (1983). While most authors find greater 
appellate scrutiny of capital cases, some commentators argue that during capital trials, capital juries 
are more prone to convict the defendant than noncapital juries. See Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of 
Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common in Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469, 474-76 
(1996). See also  Claudia L. Cowan et al., The Effects of Death Qualification on Jurors’ Predisposition 
to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation , 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53 (1984); Robert Fitzgerald & 
Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Control: Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 31 (1984). This capital jury conviction aptness could itself lead to a higher degree of 
appellate reversals of capital trial convictions because juries would be sending a disproportionate 
number of error-prone capital cases up to the appellate courts for review. 
 240. See FRANK CARRINGTON, NEITHER CRUEL NOR UNUSUAL 123 (1978) (“[O]ur legal system 
examines capital convictions with such an intense scrutiny.”); Gross, supra  note 239, at 473 (“[W]e do 
devote more attention to capital cases than to other felony prosecutions.”).  
 Just as the Liebman Study  authors recognize in Death Matters, a Reply to Latzer and Cauthen , 
judges see death as the most serious punishment and will be more likely to ask for a retrial of a case 
that takes a person’s life. Liebman et al., Death Matters, supra note 86, 72-76. Additionally, the 
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have mandatory passes to do so and have their lives at stake.241 In addition, 
many organizations have established contributions, funds, and programs 
for appealing capital cases but not noncapital cases.242 These 
organizations, along with the attraction of a capital case to many lawyers, 
help to create strong capital appeals.243 Each of these factors contributes to 
significantly higher scrutiny and “serious error” rates in capital cases than 
in noncapital cases. Consequently, if the system is working, one should 
expect to find high “serious error” in capital cases. 
Finally, even if all of the noted “serious errors” were serious, the 
judicial system rectified every “serious error” noted in the Liebman 
Study.244 The system, not Professor Liebman and his colleagues, found 
these errors and the system corrected them. Through appeals, our judicial 
system seeks, finds, and corrects serious error. Thus, if this is error that the 
judicial system corrected, the system, established for this purpose, is doing 
its job. If the authors found a significant amount of errors that the judicial 
system did not find or a significant number of innocent people who could 
 
 
Supreme Court has acknowledged that courts should look more carefully at capital cases than 
noncapital cases. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. at 998-99 (“[T]he qualitative difference of death 
from all other punishments requires a corresponding greater degree of scrutiny of that capital 
sentencing determination.”). 
 241. As the U.S. judicial system mandates many types of appeals, capital defendants are more 
prone to file for appeal than noncapital defendants. See Latzer & Cauthen I, supra  note 85, at 70 
(discussing capital defendants’ higher “incentive to file appeals”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE , BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW 12 (1995) (discussing the inability of short -
term inmates to file habeas corpus petitions). 
 242. Many organizations, such as Professor Liebman’s former employer, the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund, seek out capital cases on appeal to help indigent capitally convicted defendants appeal 
their death sentences. See BANNER, supra  note 17 (manuscript at chs. 9-10). 
 243. Gross, supra  note 239 at 497-98 (“ [The capital defendant] is likely to be better represented 
on direct appeal than he would be otherwise, and he is likely to have counsel on the post-appellate 
collateral review, while most defendants have none.”).  
 244. The Liebman Study  authors determined a “serious error” only by looking to those corrections 
made by appellate courts. Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 134-38 nn.33-40. Thus, the U.S. capital 
punishment system had corrected every “serious error” that the authors found. The Liebman Study 
authors respond to this problem by stating that this is the only option for this type of study. Liebman et 
al., Death Matters, supra note 86, at 74. This response is not sufficient. If the only option for a study 
will not yield to proper analysis, then the study cannot bypass the problem by simply acknowledging 
it, using the option, and claiming the analysis will not be flawed. See KING ET AL., supra  note 31, at 7-
9, 25-27. Additionally, the Liebman Study claims a connection between Illinois Governor Ryan’s 1999 
decision (to stop executions due to the fact that some convicted prisoners were found to be innocent 
while on death row after their appeals process) and the degree of “serious error” in Illinois’s capital 
punishment system. See Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 3, 79. This paral lel does not exist because 
“serious error” measures only appellate court decisions and the decision, by Governor Ryan was based 
on truly innocent convictions after the appeals process, a subset of cases that the Liebman Study does 
not measure. Several authors have noted that a problem with the Liebman Study  is that it purports to 
show error, but it cannot identify a single erroneously-conducted execution. See, e.g., Snyder, supra 
note 85, at A1; Wilson, supra note 85, at B5. 
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not get into the system, the authors would consider the system broken. 
However, the only errors that the authors found were those also found and 
corrected by the system that the authors claim is broken. 245  
C. Validity of the Liebman Study’s State -by-State Comparisons 
In Part VIII of the Liebman Study, the authors examine state-by-state 
error rates.246 The study looks at each state court system’s degree of error 
and compares the different systems.247 Using the same “serious error” 
variable from the earlier parts of the study, the study measured the degree 
of each state’s “error” by the number of times an appellate court considers 
a trial court’s verdict problematic.248 The authors consider a state’s error 
rate to be “better,” or containing less error, if the error rate is lower.249 In 
fact, the authors state that “observers and policy makers” should consider 
the comparisons between individual state error rates.250 Specifically, the 
authors call Illinois’s overall error rate, which is two percent lower than 
the national average, better than average.251 Also, despite its relevance as 
one of fifty states and the second highest death penalty state since 1973, 
the authors ignore Virginia’s extremely low error rate in all sections of 
state-by-state error review.252 The prominence of these figures is evident 
from newspaper and periodical use of these state -by-state figures to 
compare the status of certain state systems.253 
The Liebman Study devotes sixty pages to these state and regional 
 
 
 245. This Note does not attempt address the viability, possible success, or preference for a study 
measuring the error that someone outside the legal system prepared. This Note solely addresses the 
degree to which the data, analysis, process, and procedure of the Liebman Study , which does address 
errors not found by the U.S. legal system, supports its conclusions. 
 246. See Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 51-109. 
 247. See id. at 53-54, 57, 61, 63, 66-67, 69-70, 72-73, 77-78, 81, 83-84, 86. 
 248. Id. at 134-37 nn.33-40. 
 249. See id. at 55, 64, 75-76, 79. 
 250. Id. at 51. 
 251. See Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 79.  
 252. See id. at 64, 75, 80. 
 253. See Eric Brazil, Death Penalty Study: Bad News for State, for 1976-95, 87% of Capital 
Sentences Delivered in California Were Found Defective, S.F. EXAMINER, June 13, 2000, at A8; 
Capital Case Errors High in Georgia: 80% of Death  Penalty Trials Flawed, FLA. TIMES UNION 
(Jacksonville), June 13, 2000, at A1; Frank Green, Broken System or Better One? Study: VA. Reverses 
Fewest Death -Penalty Cases in U.S., RICHMOND T IMES-DISPATCH , June 12, 2000, at A1; Sally Kestin, 
Death Penalty Errors Vex State Mistakes Among the Highest in Nation, SUN-SENTINEL  (Ft. 
Lauderdale, Fla.), June 19, 2000, at 1A; Brooke A. Masters, Death Row Cases in Va. Earn New Court 
Scrutiny, WASH . POST, Mar. 29, 2001, at B1, B4; Kevin McDermott & Eric Stern, Missouri Rates Well 
on Death Penalty “Errors,” Suspended Illinois System Is Average for U.S., Study Finds, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, June 13, 2000, at A1, A8. 
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comparisons.254 Although the charts and graphs of these comparisons do 
indicate differences,255 they are not meaningful. Aside from the 
substantive problems of the Liebman Study’s Part VIII, the authors do not 
analyze the state-by-state data with any statistics or concrete 
comparison. 256 The authors often describe possible correlation among 
variables by “looking at them” without any true comparison or statistical 
analysis.257 In fact, the authors refer to certain state-by-state analysis as “a 
rough measure.”258 Comparison tools such as Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient,259 R2 statistic,260 and linear regression261 are all sufficient 
means of statistical comparisons that Professor Liebman and his 
colleagues do not employ. 262 These statistical tests would yield results 
more trustworthy than comments that a relationship seems to appear 
“wildly and randomly” or “weak.”263 
Much like in the Liebman Study’s national analysis, the variable that 
the authors used to compare the error rates among states and regions is 
“serious error,” or “overall error rates.”264 The authors calculated the 
amount of “reversals” of trial court decisions for each state.265 However, 
this variable does not simply measure the error within trial courts. 
Although the authors failed to acknowledge the variable’s possible 
multifaceted measurement, “serious error” simultaneously also measures 
the degree of willingness of an appellate court to reverse or remand a 
capital verdict.266 In fact, these two measurements of the variable are 
indistinguishable. A high rate of trial court reversals within a state could 
mean that (1) the state’s trial courts are fraught with error or (2) the state’s 
 
 
 254. Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 51-112. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Regarding valid assertions, an academic community must be assured that the assertions from 
data are valid rather than ad hoc guesses. See KING ET AL., supra note 31, at 96-97, 130-32, 168-69; 
NORUSIS, supra  note 47, at 360-90; WRIGHT, supra  note 31, at 135-58.  
 257. See KING ET AL ., supra  note 31, at 94. 
 258. Id. at 102.  
 259. See NORUSIS, supra  note 47, at 365-66; SINGLETON ET AL., supra note 31, at 78, 407; 
WRIGHT, supra  note 31, at 144-46. See also supra  note 46. 
 260. See WRIGHT, supra note 31, at 150; NORUSIS, supra note 47, at 388. See also  supra  note 45. 
 261. See KING ET AL., supra note 31, at 96-7, 130-32, 168-69; WRIGHT, supra  note 31, at 135-58. 
See also supra  note 47. 
 262. See Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 51-109. 
 263. Id. at 94. 
 264. Id. at 134-37 nn.33-40. 
 265. See id. 
 266. Because “serious error” is a measure of how often an appellate court finds “error” in trial 
courts, a state’s degree of error is affected in every case by both (1) the state’s errors at trial level and 
also (2) the state appellate judges’ propensity to find error at trial level. See discussion supra  Part 
IV.B. 
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appellate courts or federal appellate courts267 are prone to reversing 
decisions. Conversely, a low rate of trial court reversals could mean that 
(1) the state’s trial courts have few errors or (2) the state’s appellate courts 
or federal appellate courts are prone to leaving state court decisions alone. 
Unfortunately, there is no way to separate these two measurements from 
“serious error.”268 There is no way to tell what a high or low value of 
“serious error” indicates for each state. Although the Liebman Study’s 
authors were looking for an observable implication of error at the trial 
level, their measurement value (“serious error”) cannot provide a 
measurement of the implication that a state’s trial system269 has a high or 
low error rate. If hypothetical state E, whose trial courts have many capital 
errors, has a staunch, pro-capital punishment, nonreversing appellate court 
system, then E will have a low “serious error value.” Despite the fact that 
E’s court system is fraught with capital trial level error, Professor Liebman 
and his colleagues would incorrectly conclude that E’s capital trial level 
error is low due to E’s low “serious error rate” value.  
Examples of this measurement confusion are evident from the study’s 
data. Virginia continually has extremely low rates of reversals.270 
However, this low “serious error” rate cannot explain whether Virginia’s 
trial courts’ capital cases have little error, or if Virginia appellate courts 
tend to let capital cases stand on their own, or if each of these two 
scenarios are true.271 The authors failed to make this distinction even 
though Virginia 272 consistently ranks far below the other states in “error 
 
 
 267. Because the only role for federal courts in capital punishment is through habeas corpus 
appeals, federal court data will be available from that state only if habeas corpus appeals are included 
from that state. Thus, as such appeals are not always included in the Liebman Study’s figures, and 
some states have very few examples, these figures alone are not very helpful. See Liebman Study, 
supra note 1, at 51-109. 
 268. The Liebman Study raises a defense to this concern by concluding that state judges act 
similarly to federal judges in that state. Id. at 80-81. However, this defense does not successfully 
counter this concern because most federal judges in a state have come from state courts in that state 
and are likely still influenced by instate factors. See Latzer & Cauthen I, supra  note 85, at 68. 
 269. See generally  Lori Montgomery & Daniel LeDuc, Sentences Without Finality , WASH. P OST, 
Feb. 4, 2001, at A1, A18 (describing how different judges in different states treat the sentencing of 
criminals incongrously and how different laws in different states cause uneven reviewing of cases). 
 270. According to the Liebman Study, Virginia has ten percent direct state court reversal (t he 
lowest of all states; forty-one percent national average), thirteen percent all state court reversal (the 
lowest of all states; forty-seven percent national average), and eighteen percent “overall error rate” (the 
lowest of all states; sixty-eight percent national average). Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 53, 61, 77-
79. 
 271. The authors have trouble with this phenomenon. See Liebman Study supra note 1, at 55, 64, 
75-76, 80. 
 272. Nationally, Virginia ranks second for executions from 1973-1998. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
1998, supra note 202, at 10.   
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rate.” Instead, the authors offer no explanation for this phenomenon and 
call Virginia a “distinct anomaly” 273 and an “outlier.”274 Because the 
variable “serious error” is a measurement of both of these phenomena, one 
cannot use it to compare the degree of error within a trial court.275 In fact, 
despite the fact that the Liebman Study applauds low-error states, a 
significant portion of the lowest “serious error” states have the highest 
rates of per capita executions.276 Nonetheless, some authorities are even 
using these state error rate comparisons to support state public policy. 277  
Similarly, many of the Liebman Study’s state -by-state non-error rate 
conclusions are not supported. The study attempts to establish correlations, 
or the lack thereof, between state -by-state death sentences and each of the 
following statewide characteristics: executions, homicides, race, political 
pressure, state spending on courts, and caseloads.278 Although the study 
does graph these statistics, even the authors admit that proper analysis 
would be a matter “requiring more sophisticated analysis.”279 The authors 
 
 
 273. Liebman Study, supra note 1, at  64, 68. 
 274. Id. at 80. 
 275. As appellate courts make the ultimate decision to find error or not, one cannot separate their 
propensity towards finding error in capital cases from the “actual” or “true” error at trial level. This 
measurement of trial error (“serious error”) chosen by the Professor Liebman and his colleagues is not 
a valid measurement of such error because it contains a separate variable characteristic—willingness 
of a state’s appellate court to find error in trial courts—that determines the level of “serious error” 
value.  
 276. For error rates in direct appeals (the only error chart with significant state comparisons 
including all states), the bottom three, lowest -ranked, error states have the 2nd, 5th, and 1st highest 
rates of per capita executions respectively. Compare Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 53, with  CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 1998, supra note 202, at 10. For error rates in all state courts (data not available for all 
states), the bottom three lowest- ranked error states have the 2nd, 5th, and 28th highest rates of per 
capita executions rates respectively. Compare Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 61, with  CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 1998, supra note 202, at 10. For error rates in habeas corpus cases (some states with less 
than three cases), the bottom three lowest-ranked error states have the 1st, 2nd, and 6th highest rates of 
per capita executions rates respectively. Compare Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 66, with  CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 1998, supra note 202, at 10. For overall error rates (data not available for all states), the 
bottom three lowest-ranked error states have the 2nd, 5th, and 3rd highest per capita execution rates 
respectively. Compare Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 77, with  CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1998, supra 
note 202, at 10.  
 One might explain the above pattern by the fact that the states with the greater execution rates 
have appellate justices that are more prone to approve of executions and not be against capital 
punishment. Such patterns might also occur due to public opinion, institutional factors, or state 
biographical information. Professor Liebman and his colleagues addressed none of these possibilities. 
See Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 51-109. 
 277. See, e.g., Denise Young, The Debate over Arizona’s Death Penalty, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Nov. 2000, 
at 26, 30 n.32. 
 278. For the execution comparisons, see Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 91-94. For homicide 
comparisons, see id. at 97-99. For race comparisons, see id. at 99-101. For political pressure 
comparisons, see id. at 103-05. For state expenditures comparisons, see id. at 106-05. For state 
caseload comparisons, see id. at 110-12. 
 279. Id. at 99. 
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casually view the graphs and make vague statements about the 
relationships of the variables.280 Instead of eyeballing the trends and 
comparing a few states, the authors should have utilized proper statistical 
comparison such as Pearson’s correlation coefficient, R2 statistic, or even 
linear regression analysis.281 In fact, because the Liebman Study authors 
are attempting to predict why certain states act as they do towards death 
sentences, they would likely benefit from the use of a multiple regression 
analysis, which could isolate each variable’s effect on other variables and 
provide a much clearer picture of whether a certain variable (like 
homicides) actually contributes to the dependent variable (death 
sentences).282 
The Liebman Study’s own measurement for its independent variable 
(“serious error”) cannot effectively explain its dependent variable (trial 
court error within state courts). “Serious error” among states cannot 
explain whether a state’s trial courts have more or less error than another 
state’s trail court. Consequently, the Liebman Study’s data cannot verify 
the author’s conclusions about state differences. Therefore, the “observers 
and policy makers,”283 of whom the authors suggest should take note of 
their figures, should not base any policy decisions on these unsupported 
conclusions. 
V. PROPOSAL 
The Liebman Study did not confirm that the U.S. capital punishment 
system is broken. The study did not prove that the U.S. judicial system 
“fail[s] to catch and correct some amount of the error that has flooded the 
system.”284 Although Professor Liebman and his colleagues failed to 
conclusively confirm their theory, researchers could conduct successive 
studies that would effectively analyze some of the Liebman Study’s 
proposed theories. 
 
 
 280. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. 
 281. See NORUSIS, supra note 47, at 455-88; supra notes 47-49 and accompanying discussion. 
 282. Multiple linear regression analysis allows one to see how a dependent variable reacts to the 
many different independent variables. By using single linear regression analysis (even this was not 
employed by the Liebman Study), one would not account for the influence of these other factors. See 
NORUSIS, supra note 47, at 455-88. Even the authors of the Liebman Study admit that many different 
factors may be influencing the effect and use of capital punishment at the same time. See Liebman 
Study, supra note 1, at 91-105. In order to explain many of the questions that the authors are asking in 
their state comparison section, it might also be helpful to include non-death penalty states into their 
equation. This would present a broader picture of why a state would or would not have the death 
penalty and by what degree the state is imposing death sentences.  
 283. Liebman Study, supra note 1, at 51. 
 284. Id. at 121. 
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A study addressing the theories posited by the authors of the Liebman 
Study could take steps that would lead to more trustworthy results and 
conclusions. First and foremost, the study must utilize proper empirical 
social scientific research methodology. 285 Such processes could solve 
many of the problems that exist within the Liebman Study, beyond general 
methodology. 286 Additionally, the Liebman Study’s theory was extremely 
vague287 and its targeted conclusions were too broad to be addressed by a 
few independent variables.288 In fact, aside from attempting to answer on 
too broad of a theory in one step, the authors addressed nationwide and 
state differential problems and attempted to explain why capital 
punishment is more prevalent in certain states or regions of the country.289 
A study could be more conclusive, more detailed, and less vague than the 
Liebman Study by simply making its analysis more focused and addressing 
its theories more carefully. A study that solely attempts to address one 
aspect of the U.S. capital punishment system290 can more easily conduct 
proper methodology and connect independent variables to dependent 
variables than a study that targets many significant areas of the U.S. 
capital punishment system. If, after analyzing the conclusions of many of 
these studies, the U.S. capital punishment system appears to be broken, 
then the authors could better evaluate their theory. 
 
 
 285. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 286. The following examples highlight how proper methodology could solve some of the other 
problems in the study. The authors of the study could solve the problems of the degree of seriousness 
in the “serious error” figure with full disclosure of the data and replicability of the study. See 
discussion supra Parts IV.A-B. With observable implications and choice of measurements, the authors 
would have likely been able to correct many of the general problems with their “serious error” 
variable. See id. By addressing the null hypothesis of their study, the authors would address any bias 
inherent in their research and analysis and likely quiet many critics. See discussion supra  Part IV.A. 
See also  Latzer & Cauthen I, supra  note 85, at 64-67; Snyder, supra note 85, at A1; Wilson, supra 
note 85, at B5. 
 287. The Liebman Study  never clarified what it meant by “broken system.” See Liebman Study, 
supra  note 1, at 121-24. It stated a broad hypothesis without support and never explained how it would 
show the failure of the U.S. capital punishment system. See id. at 1-7, 121-24. 
 288. The Liebman Study’s authors attempted to establish that the system was “broken” almost 
exclusively by the vague variable “serious error.” Compare supra  notes 171-72 and accompanying 
discussion, with supra  note 287. 
 289. See supra Part IV.C and accompanying discussion. 
 290. Any one of the following examples could be a separate study with focused theories that 
would establish a significant step in better understanding the U.S. capital punishment system: (1) the 
reasons for which capital punishment exists only in certain states; (2) the reasons for which certain 
states have higher rates of death sentences and executions; (3) the prevalence of innocent capital 
convictions not caught by the U.S. judicial system; (4) the extent to which the U.S. capital punishment 
system differs from the general U.S. criminal punishment system and whether the incongruities 
account for the differences in current appellate reversal rates between the two systems.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The Liebman Study’s results and conclusions are problematic. 
Professor Liebman and his colleagues do not follow proper empirical 
social scientific research methodology and do not use proper 
measurements to support their conclusions. “Serious error,” as defined and 
analyzed by the authors of the Liebman Study, does not justify or lead to 
the conclusion that the U.S. capital punishment system is broken. 
Considering that the Liebman Study’s conclusions are unfounded, public 
policy makers should not rely on its findings, courts should not reform 
their practices due to its analysis, and commentators should not compare it 
to significant policy papers of the past century. Nonetheless the Liebman 
Study does posit some serious and significant theories about the U.S. 
capital punishment system, and those theories may be entirely valid. 
However, the Liebman Study does not provide much assistance in 
establishing support for those theories. 
Adam L. VanGrack* 
 
 
 * A.B. (1998), Washington University in St. Louis; J.D. Candidate (2002), Washington 
University School of Law. 
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